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 Little has been written about US-Singapore interactions before World 
War I and this thesis aims to shed light on the relationship between the United 
States and Singapore during the years 1898-1906. My study positions US-
Singapore ties within the larger context of regional and international events and 
studies the changes in US interactions with Singapore during this period. The 
years 1898-1906 marked a transitional period for US-Singapore ties with 
Singapore as there were wide-ranging changes in commercial and diplomatic 
exchanges between the United States and Singapore as well as in American 
missionary activity in Singapore. 
 
 This thesis shows that these changes were largely propelled by wider 
regional events during this period, such as the Spanish-American War, the 
Philippine-American War and its aftermath, and the Chinese boycott of American 
goods. These regional developments forged new and complex links between the 
United States and Singapore and in doing so, fostered closer ties between them. 
The role of the US consul-general in Singapore in this relationship will also be 
examined.  
 
 Starting with the Spanish-American War in 1898, the United States was 
drawn to the Pacific region and its presence in the region started to grow. 
Singapore became involved in the Spanish-American War because of the actions 
of the US consul-general in Singapore. His actions were to have significant 
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ramifications for the course of the war. The subsequent acquisition of the 
Philippines after the war meant that the United States had a stake in the Pacific 
and was obliged to protect its interests. As the role of the United States in the 
Pacific started to change, US-Singapore interactions were influenced as well. 
These international developments would help shape US perceptions of Singapore 
and affect how American officials, businessmen and missionaries interact with 
merchants and British colonial authorities in Singapore. 
 
 By 1905, stability was slowly restored to the Philippines but another 
international event came to dominate US-Singapore interactions. The Chinese 
boycott of American goods in 1905 originated from Shanghai but spread to the 
overseas communities in the Pacific, including Singapore. The impact of the 
Chinese boycott on US-Singapore ties will be explored in this thesis. By the end of 
1906, the relationship between the United States and Singapore was no longer 








The United States and the Pacific before 1898 
 In the 1850s, US politician William Seward predicted, “European thought, 
European commerce, and European enterprise…will nevertheless relatively sink 
in importance in the future, while the Pacific Ocean, its shores, its islands, and 
adjacent territories will become the chief theatre of human events and activities 
in the world’s great hereafter.”1 Since few shared his views at that time, Seward’s 
words went unheeded. Four decades later, American expansionists would quote 
his statements to bolster their arguments for acquiring a colony in the Pacific.2 
 
 The relationship between the United States and the Pacific region dates 
back to the late eighteenth century, when American vessels sailed to China in 
search of trade opportunities. The American merchants often took the eastbound 
route across the Atlantic Ocean, around the Cape of Good Hope, to ports in the 
Indian Ocean, the East Indies and finally Canton.3 The British colony of Singapore 
lay along this route and its strategic location at the tip of the Straits of Melaka 
made it a key port of call in the region. Founded by the British in 1819, Singapore 
attracted many traders due to its free port status. Under British rule, Singapore 
soon became a well-known trade emporium where the produce of the Malay 
                                                        
1 Anthony McGrew, “Restructuring Foreign and Defence Policy: The USA”, in Asia-Pacific in the 
New World Order, ed. Anthony McGrew and Christopher Brook (London: Routledge, 1998), p.158. 
2 Pekka Korhonen, Japan and Asia-Pacific Integration: Pacific Romances 1968-1996 (London: 
Routledge, 1998), p.93. 
3 Yap Chee Seng, “The Career of Joseph Balestier as an American Diplomat and Businessman in 
Singapore, 1836-1852”, Honors Thesis, Department of History, National University of Singapore 
(NUS), 1986, p.7. 
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Archipelago and goods of Europe, India and China were exchanged.4 By the 
1830s, Singapore replaced Batavia as the hub of junk trade from China.5 Drawn 
by the growing trade, the United States established a consulate in Singapore in 
1836.6 At this time, the United States had only set up three consulates in 
Southeast Asia: Singapore, Batavia and Manila.7 Singapore was undoubtedly an 
important trading port but it was situated in an area that the United States 
overlooked for most of the nineteenth century.8 The United States was slow to 
turn their attention towards Island South-East Asia and this region remained 
peripheral to US interests until the 1890s. 
 
 Before the 1890s, the United States was more preoccupied with domestic 
developments such as westward expansion. The issue of slavery also absorbed 
their attention during the American Civil War.9 However, events in the 1890s 
directed US interest towards the Pacific. In 1893, Frederick Jackson Turner 
wrote a paper entitled “The Significance of the Frontier in American History”, 
which argued that the frontier experience helped shape distinctive American 
characteristics. At a time when the 1890 census appeared to point toward the 
closing of the continental frontier, Turner’s thesis lent support to the 
increasingly expansionist US foreign policy that searched for new frontiers in the 
                                                        
4 Kwa Chong Guan, Derek Heng and Tan Tai Yong, Singapore: A 700-Year History – From Early 
Emporium to World City (Singapore: National Archives of Singapore, 2009), p.103. 
5 Ibid., p.111. 
6 Despatches from US Consuls in Singapore 1833-1906 (hereafter cited as Despatches), 12 April 
1837, (Microfilm), NUS Libraries. 
7 This can be inferred from the dates of the despatches from US consuls in Batavia and Manila. 
8 Pamela Sodhy, “United States Consuls in Singapore 1859-1880”, Journal of the Malayan Branch 
of the Royal Asiatic Society (hereafter cited as JMBRAS), LVI, Part 1 (June 1983), p.12. 
9 Ivan Musicant, Empire by Default: The Spanish-American War and the Dawn of the American 
Century (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1998), p.10. 
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Asia-Pacific to explore.10 Other key proponents of expansionism included Alfred 
Thayer Mahan and Theodore Roosevelt. Mahan’s paper, “The Influence of Sea 
Power upon History”, called for the expansion of the US Navy to protect their 
economic interests abroad.11 Mahan’s views were shared by Roosevelt, a rising 
politician who would become President in 1901.12 Roosevelt envisioned the 
United States as a world power and was keen on extending US power to the 
Pacific and other parts of the world.13 
 
 Moreover, by the 1890s, the US economy started producing far more than 
the domestic market could absorb. Naturally, advocates of trade expansion 
suggested exporting the surplus products to overseas markets.14 The huge China 
market dazzled American imagination, and both businessmen and politicians 
saw it as the perfect solution to their problems. In early 1898, Charles Denby, the 
US Minister to China, called for quick action to seize the opportunity that the 
China market offered.15 This heightened the importance of the Pacific region, 
which was perceived by US officials and merchants as the gateway to the fabled 
China market. Amidst this backdrop of increasing US interest in the Pacific 
region, the Spanish-American War broke out and US involvement in the Asia-
Pacific deepened as a result. 
                                                        
10 William Appleman Williams, “The Frontier Thesis and American Foreign Policy”, Pacific 
Historical Review, 24, 4, (November 1955), pp.383-384; Michael H. Hunt, The Making of A Special 
Relationship: The United States and China to 1914 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 
pp.143-168. 
11 Musicant, Empire by Default, pp.7-8. 
12 Korhonen, Japan and Asia-Pacific Integration: Pacific Romances 1968-1996, p.93. 
13 Ibid. 
14 Thomas G. Paterson, “American Businessmen and Consular Service Reform, 1890’s to 1906”, 
The Business History Review, 40, 1 (Spring 1966), p.85; Richard Werking, The Master Architects: 
Building the United States Foreign Service, 1890-1913, (Lexington: The University Press of 
Kentucky, 1977), p.22. 
15 H. W. Brands, Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines (New York; Oxford: Oxford 




The Spanish-American War of 1898 
 The Spanish-American War was a watershed event in US foreign relations 
as it propelled the United States across the Pacific. The war grew out of a 
revolution in Cuba, which was then under Spanish rule. By the late 1890s, Spain 
was in decline and its empire had dwindled to three colonies: Cuba, Puerto Rico 
and the Philippines.16 In 1895, a group of Cuban nationalists renewed their fight 
for independence and launched uprisings all across the island.17 The Cuban 
insurgents carried out a scorched earth campaign, where they destroyed 
sugarcane fields and destroyed railways, in order to drain every possible source 
of Spanish revenue.18 Consequently, there was a sharp decline in sugar 
production and the Cuban economy plunged into crisis.19 Cuban-American trade 
was adversely affected and America investments of about $50 million went up in 
smoke.20 Due to skilful propaganda by the Cuban junta in Washington and New 
York, the insurrection in Cuba gained widespread sympathy and support from 
the American public.21 
 
 The US political administration grew increasingly concerned over the 
volatile situation in Cuba as well. In 1897, William McKinley succeeded Grover 
Cleveland as US President. Desiring a peaceful end to the revolt in Cuba, 
                                                        
16 Richard Hines, “’First to Respond to Their Country’s Call’: The First Montana Infantry and the 
Spanish-American War and Philippine Insurrection, 1898-1899”, Montana: The Magazine of 
Western History, 52, 3 (Autumn, 2002), p.46. 
17 Michael Golay, Spanish-American War, Updated Edition (New York: Infobase Publishing, 2009), 
p.2. 
18 Musicant, Empire by Default, p.50. 
19 Ibid., p.57. 
20 Lewis L. Gould, The Spanish-American War & President McKinley (Kansas: University Press of 
Kansas, 1982), p.24. 
21 Ibid., p.20. 
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McKinley turned up the diplomatic heat on Spain by threatening to accord 
belligerent rights to Cuba.22 When Praxedes M. Sagasta took over as Prime 
Minister of Spain, the new Spanish regime responded positively to US overtures 
and eventually granted autonomy to Cuba.23 Yet relations between the United 
States and Spain took a turn for the worst in January 1898. Riots broke out in 
Havana, when pro-Spanish loyalists and army personnel protested against 
Cuba’s autonomy.24 In response, McKinley ordered the battleship USS Maine to 
Havana to demonstrate concern and to protect American citizens.25 On 15 
February 1898, the Maine exploded in Havana harbour, killing 266 American 
officers and crew. This incident escalated the tensions between Spain and the 
United States as much of the American public believed that Spain was 
responsible for the sinking of the Maine.26 Over the next few months, diplomatic 
overtures made little progress. Finally on 19 April 1898, Congress declared Cuba 
free and independent, and directed the President to employ military force to 
remove Spanish authority.27 Five days later, Spain declared war against the 
United States. 
 
The first major engagement of the Spanish-American War took place in 
Manila Bay in the Philippines. As early as 26 February 1898, Commodore George 
Dewey, Commander-in-chief of the US Asiatic Squadron, had received orders that 
in the event of war he was to ensure that the Spanish navy did not leave the 
                                                        
22 John Offner, “McKinley and the Spanish-American War”, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 34, 1 
(March 2004), p.54. 
23 Musicant, Empire by Default, p.30. 
24 Golay, Spanish-American War, Updated Edition, p.xvii. 
25 Offner, “McKinley and the Spanish-American War”, p.56. 
26 Hines, “’First to Respond to Their Country’s Call’: The First Montana Infantry and the Spanish-
American War and Philippine Insurrection, 1898-1899”, p.47. 
27 Ibid., p.48. 
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Asiatic Coast.28 Dewey proceeded to assemble his forces at Hong Kong and made 
preparations for war. On 27 April 1898, Dewey was informed that war had 
started between the United States and Spain, and he was directed to the Spanish 
colony of the Philippines to attack the Spanish fleet.29 On the morning of 1 May 
1898, the US Asiatic Squadron sailed into Manila Bay, where they engaged and 
destroyed the Spanish navy. This victory prompted the McKinley administration 
to send troops to wrest Manila from Spanish control.30 Meanwhile, Spain faced 
similar defeats in the Caribbean and it was a matter of time before Spain sued for 
peace. As a result of the war, the United States acquired the Philippine Islands 
and became a colonial power. The possession of a colony in the Pacific meant 
that the role of the United States in the region had shifted from an interested 
observer of Asian affairs into a proprietary player.31 As the United States became 
more involved in the Pacific region, Singapore engaged their attention as well 
since it was widely recognised as the premier port in Southeast Asia.32 
Singapore’s importance in the region meant that US presence in Singapore was 
indicative of American interest in the Asia-Pacific. 
 
The British Colony of Singapore  
As the port of Singapore grew and flourished over the years, there were 
several changes in the administration of the colony. Shortly after its founding, 
Singapore became integrated with Penang and Malacca to form the Straits 
                                                        
28 Musicant, Empire by Default, p.193. 
29 Derek Granger, “Dewey at Manila Bay”, Naval War College Review, 64, 4 (September 2011), 
p.134. 
30 Ibid., p.136. 
31 Brands, Bound to Empire: The United States and the Philippines, p.vii. 
32 Wong Lin Ken, “Singapore: Its Growth as an Entrepot Port, 1819-1941”, Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 9, 1 (March 1978), p.54. 
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Settlements in 1826.33 In 1830, the Straits Settlements was brought under the 
Presidency of Bengal in India and later in 1851, the Governor-General of India 
assumed direct control over the Straits Settlements.34 But the deficiencies of 
British India’s administration prompted Singapore’s merchant community to 
petition for direct rule under London.35 After a decade of negotiations, the Straits 
Settlements was finally made a crown colony in 1867.36 
 
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 further enhanced Singapore’s 
commercial significance to the British Empire.37 The Suez route ensured 
Singapore’s geographical supremacy since the Straits of Malacca replaced the 
Sunda Straits as the major waterway from Europe to the Far East.38 Moreover, 
with the development of steamships in merchant shipping, Singapore became a 
key coaling station for steamships to replenish their supplies.39 Consequently, 
the volume of Singapore’s trade expanded dramatically, showing an eightfold 
increase from 1873 to 1913.40 The nature of Singapore’s trade also shifted from 
exotic wares such as porcelain, tea and fabrics, to primary products of rubber 
and tin.41 While the prosperity of British firms was evident, a substantial section 
of the wealth lay in the hands of the Chinese merchants in Singapore.42 This led 
                                                        
33 Constance Mary Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, 1819-2005 (Singapore: NUS Press, 
2009), p.53. 
34 Jean Abshire, The History of Singapore (Santa Barbara: Greenwood, 2011), p.58. 
35 Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, 1819-2005, pp.86-87. 
36 Ibid., p.89. 
37 George Bogaars, “The Effect of the Opening of the Suez Canal on the Trade and Development of 
Singapore”, JMBRAS, 42, 1 (July 1969), p.210. 
38 Abshire, The History of Singapore, p.59. 
39 Kwa, Heng and Tan, Singapore: A 700-Year History, p.103. 
40 Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, 1819-2005, p.104. 
41 Abshire, The History of Singapore, p.63. 
42 Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, 1819-2005, p.107. 
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historian Mary Turnbull to comment that at the turn of the century, Singapore 
was “largely an Anglo-Chinese preserve”.43 
 
At this time, the population was largely made up of immigrants from 
China and India, and there was no consciousness of a Singaporean identity.44 The 
majority of the population intended to return to their homeland after making 
their fortune. Still, some of these migrants would eventually remain and 
permanently settle in Singapore. By the late nineteenth century, the Chinese 
community formed the majority of the population in Singapore.45 The 
overwhelming dominance of the Chinese, coupled with their key roles in the 
Singapore economy as labourers or merchants, made them a significant group 
with considerable influence in Singapore.46 Hereafter, in this thesis, the term 
“Singapore” refers to the British colonial port, where a large Chinese immigrant 
community resided. 
 
Whereas economic profits were shared by British and Chinese merchants, 
political power remained in the hands of the British. In particular, control of 
political affairs was concentrated in the hands of the Governor of the Straits 
Settlements.47 Sir Charles Mitchell was appointed the Governor in 1894, despite 
having no experience in the Straits.48 In 1896, with the creation of the Federated 
Malay States, the Governor of the Straits Settlements also became High 
                                                        
43 Ibid., p.125. 
44 Ibid., p.93. 
45 Abshire, The History of Singapore, p.46. 
46 Ibid., p.50. 
47 Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, 1819-2005, pp.94-95. 
48 H.S. Barlow, Swettenham (Kuala Lumpur: Southdene, 1995), p.446. 
9 
 
Commissioner of the Federation.49 Upon his death in 1899, James Alexander 
Swettenham took over as Acting Governor until his brother Frank Swettenham 
became the Governor in 1901.50 Frank Swettenham was renowned for his 
knowledge pertaining to Malay affairs and his appointment reflected how 
important Singapore had become to the Colonial Office.51 In 1904, Swettenham 
was succeeded by Sir John Anderson, who had served twenty-five years in the 
Colonial Office and had the complete confidence of the British government.52 
Singapore’s strategic importance had increased over the years, as demonstrated 
by the expanded powers of the Governor, as well as the political appointments. 
US interactions with Singapore hence took place within this complicated colonial 
framework. Generally, the Governor and the US consul-general had sufficient 
autonomy to settle most issues between them, though the British Colonial Office 




 US-Singapore interactions in the pre-1945 period have not paid much 
attention to the years 1898-1906. Scholars like Shakila Yacob and Jim Baker 
consider the interwar years as the time of change in US interactions with 
Singapore and similarly, Wong Lin Ken tends to point out World War I as the 
                                                        
49 Barbara Watson Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 2nd  Edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), 
p.187. 
50 Barlow, Swettenham, p.491. 
51 Ernest Chew, “Sir Frank Swettenham and the Federation of the Malay States”, Modern Asian 
Studies, 2, 1 (January 1968), p.168. 
52 Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, 1819-2005, p.109. 
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defining moment that brought about changes in US-Singapore trade.53 However, I 
argue that the period 1898-1906 is another significant transitional phase in US-
Singapore interactions. This thesis hopes to redress this gap in existing literature 
by studying this overlooked period of change. 
 
 My research focuses on the period 1898-1906 and examines how regional 
and international developments effected varied and extensive changes in 
political, economic and social ties between the United States and British 
Singapore. The Spanish-American War marked the start of this period of change 
as the shift in US role in the Pacific influenced American interactions with 
colonial Singapore. By 1899, acquisition of the Philippines resulted in an 
expanded quadrangular relationship encompassing the United States, Britain, 
and the colonies of Singapore and the Philippines. The Philippine-American War 
added complexity to the evolving connections between the United States and 
Singapore. The 1905-1906 Chinese boycott of American products was another 
international event that heightened Washington’s awareness of Singapore’s 
rising importance. 
 
 My study ends in 1906 when the US consular service was 
professionalised. A consular reorganisation bill was passed by Congress on 5 
April 1906 and consular officers were reclassified under a new system.54 The bill 
                                                        
53 Shakila Yacob, The United States and the Malaysian Economy (London; New York: Routledge, 
2008), p.34; Jim Baker, The Eagle in the Lion City: America, Americans and Singapore (Singapore: 
Landmark Books, 2005), pp.136-7; Wong, “Singapore: Its Growth as an Entrepot Port, 1819-
1941”, pp.69-84; although Yacob’s book is primarily on US-Malaya relations, US interactions with 
Singapore can be extrapolated from her work. 
54 Charles Stuart Kennedy, The American Consul: A History of the United States Consular Service 
1776-1914 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), p.219. 
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also established consular inspection corps and required each post to be 
inspected every two years.55 Up till 1906, the US consular service was allegedly 
staffed with amateurs, rogues, and inept officials and there were many scandals 
involving the consuls.56 The reform of the US consular service marks the end of 
the transitional period as the United States decided to have a more systemic and 
effective consular service to manage their overseas interests. The impact of the 
consular reforms on US interactions with Singapore requires further analysis 
beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
 One of my key sources pertaining to diplomatic interactions between the 
United and Singapore is the Despatches from United States Consuls in Singapore, 
official communications from the US consul-general at Singapore to the Assistant 
Secretary of State in Washington. Among this collection of records, there is a 
detailed report on British administration of the Malay States written by Frank 
Swettenham, who was the Resident-General of the Federated Malay States at that 
time. Swettenham wrote it upon a request by the US consul-general in Singapore 
and a section on British governance of Singapore was included in the document. 
This source has not surfaced in existing scholarship as it resides within the 
American consul despatches and is not found in the British archives, where most 
of Swettenham’s papers are located. 
 
 However, the Despatches are uni-directional and only offer one side of the 
correspondence. To supplement this collection of documents, RG 84: Records of 
                                                        
55 Ibid. 
56 Eileen Scully, “Taking the Low Road to Sino-American Relations: “Open Door” Expansionists 
and the Two China Markets”, Journal of American History, 82, 1 (Jun 1995), p.71. 
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the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State, 1788-ca. 1991, held at the 
National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), is useful in supplying the 
other side of the correspondence. RG 59: General Records of the Department of 
State, 1756-1999, held at NARA, is also valuable to my work as it holds an 
assortment of correspondence between the US consul-general and British 
colonial officials in Singapore, as well as merchants from the United States and 
Singapore. 
 
 Trade figures pertaining to Singapore and the United States are obtained 
from the Straits Settlements Blue Books and Straits Settlements Annual Reports, 
and these colonial reports help to paint a clearer picture of the economic 
exchanges between the United States and Singapore. In addition, Commercial 
Relations of the United States with Foreign Countries, which is a compilation of the 
annual reports of US consular officers, provides a different set of statistics for 
analysis. The abovementioned sources paint a picture of the official relations 
between the United States and Singapore. But the unofficial representations are 
also equally important. My sources also include newspapers such as the 
Singapore Free Press, The Straits Times, Lat Pau, New York Times, Washington 
Post and Manila Times. Furthermore, the Minutes of Meetings of the Annual 
Malaysia Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church and The Malaysia 
Message, a Methodist publication, were useful in providing information on 
Methodist missionary activity in Singapore, Malaya and the Philippines.  
 
 My focus on the three aspects of diplomatic interactions, commercial 
exchanges and missionary activities is framed by the diffused nature of sources 
13 
 
on US-Singapore ties during 1898-1906. The scarcity of literature on US-
Singapore interactions in the pre-1945 period is likely because of how Singapore 
has often been “treated as an integral part of the Straits Settlements or British 
Malaya”.57 Due to their intertwining history, many historians, including Pamela 
Sodhy and Shakila Yacob, tend to subsume US-Singapore interactions under US-
Malaya relations. Sodhy’s The US-Malaysian Nexus: Themes in Superpower-Small 
State Relations posits that before 1945, colonial Malaya was confined to a passive 
role in the triangular relationship with the United States due to strong British 
political control over the Malay States.58 Sodhy’s focus was on the political 
relationship between the United States and British Malaya, and she incorporated 
US-Singapore interactions into her work. On the other hand, Yacob’s book 
concentrates exclusively on the economic ties between the United States and 
colonial Malaya, and offers an in-depth study of how the British facilitated US 
trade and investment in both Singapore and Malaya. While Sodhy and Yacob 
ascribes passivity to British Malaya’s role in its relationship with the United 
States before 1945, my research shows the opposite. In 1905, the Chinese 
community in Singapore, as well as in Malaya, displayed agency in boycotting 
American goods to demonstrate their unhappiness with US immigration laws. 
 
 Theodore Doraisamy and Earnest Lau also chose to not to separate these 
two territories in their studies on American Methodists in Singapore and 
                                                        
57 Wong, “Singapore: Its Growth as an Entrepot Port, 1819-1941”, p.50 
58 Pamela Sodhy, The US-Malaysian Nexus: Themes in Superpower-Small State Relations (Kuala 
Lumpur: Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Malaysia, 1991), p.40. 
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Malaysia.59 Both Doraisamy and Lau delved into the spread of Methodism not 
just in Singapore and Malaysia, but also the Philippines and Indonesia, to 
highlight the international nature of their mission. Although they touched on the 
connections between the Philippine Mission and the Singapore Mission, the links 
between the United States, the Philippines and colonial Singapore were not 
clearly drawn since it was not their intention to do so. Hence my dissertation 
expands on their work by exploring the missionary aspect of US-Singapore 
interactions. My study will also look at how the acquisition of the Philippines 
after the Spanish-American War had a significant impact on the development of 
the Singapore Mission.  
 
 However, the relationship between the United States and Singapore in the 
pre-1945 period can also be studied on its own as Singapore’s economy, 
government and population were distinct from that of the Malay Peninsula. This 
is illustrated in works on US-Singapore interactions by Sharom Ahmat, Yap Chee 
Seng and Wong Lin Ken.60 In particular, Wong’s article provides an extensive 
historical survey of US-Singapore trade connections from 1819-1941. While he 
takes into account the influence of several external events on Singapore’s 
economy, Wong does not make any reference to regional events in the 
Philippines nor China. This neglect is symptomatic of existing studies in US-
Singapore interactions and likewise, Sodhy and Yacob tend to neglect the wider 
                                                        
59 Theodore R. Doraisamy, The March of Methodism in Singapore and Malaysia, 1885-1980 
(Singapore: Methodist Book Room, 1982); Earnest Lau, From Mission to Church: The Evolution of 
the Methodist Church in Singapore and Malaysia, 1885-1976 (Singapore: Genesis Books, 2008). 
60 Sharom Ahmat, “Joseph B. Balestier: First American Consul at Singapore, 1833-1852”, JMBRAS, 
XXXIX (December, 1966), pp.108-122; Sharom Ahmat, “American Trade with Singapore, 1819-
65”, JMBRAS, XXXVIII, 2, (December 1965), pp.241-257; Yap, “The Career of Joseph Balestier as an 
American Diplomat and Businessman in Singapore, 1836-1852”, Honors Thesis, Department of 
History, NUS, 1986; Wong, “Singapore: Its Growth as an Entrepot Port, 1819-1941”, pp.50-84. 
15 
 
international context of the Philippines and China that helped shape changes in 
US-Malayan interactions. 
 
 Jim Baker’s recent book on US interactions with Singapore is one of few 
works that briefly discusses the Spanish-American War and the boycott of 
American goods.61 Nevertheless, Baker merely describes the events and does not 
explicate the impact of these developments in changing the relationship between 
the United States and Singapore. Furthermore, he does not mention the 
Philippine-American War and its role in framing US connections with Singapore. 
Little research has been done on the broader international context surrounding 
US-Singapore interactions and my thesis fills in this gap in existing literature by 
studying the US-Singapore relationship within the wider context of 
developments in the Philippines as well as China during the years 1898 to 1906. 
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 This thesis is organised in chronological order to best demonstrate the 
unfolding of international and regional events that influenced US-Singapore 
interactions. The chapters are divided according to the periods that the various 
US consul-generals at Singapore took office. This arrangement allows the actions 
of the US consul-general, the prime American representative in Singapore, to be 
examined. 
 
 The first chapter will look at how the Spanish-American War sparked a 
series of changes in US-Singapore interactions in 1898. The actions of the US 
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consul-general in Singapore are particularly important as it was to have 
significant ramifications for the relationship between the United States and 
Singapore. The second chapter proceeds to study how the initial stages of the 
Philippine-American War changed the dynamics of US-Singapore ties during 
1899-1900. This period will show how the US was grappling with its changing 
role in the Pacific region, and the implications this held for Singapore. The 
acquisition of the Philippines also diverted the attention of the Methodists from 
Singapore to Manila, and these changes will also be explored. 
 
 The last stages of the Philippine-American War will be examined in the 
third chapter, which will cover the years 1901-1904. As stability was slowly 
established in the Philippines, other external events came to shape the evolving 
relationship between the United States and Singapore as well. The fourth chapter 
delves into the Chinese boycott of American goods in 1905. The development of 
the Chinese boycott in Singapore and the effects of the boycott on US-Singapore 
interactions will be studied in this section. Through these regional and 











Chapter One: Winds of Change 
 
 During the nineteenth century, Singapore was of peripheral interest to the 
United States especially since Asia was considered “a backwater of American 
diplomacy”.62 To officials and policymakers in Washington, Europe was always 
accorded a higher priority and this attitude is reflected in how the most 
prestigious US diplomatic posts were in European capitals and not in Asia.63 
Even within Asia, Singapore was often marginalised as US attention was largely 
focused on China.64 Despite the fact that American trade with China in 1897 was 
“less than two per cent of its total foreign trade”,65 the “magic figure of four 
hundred million customers” enchanted American merchants and politicians and 
gave the China market an inflated importance beyond the reality of commerce 
involved.66 Washington was also more interested in Siam (Thailand) than 
Singapore, as Siam was the only country in Southeast Asia not colonised by 
European powers.67 However, because of the Spanish-American War in 1898, 
American policymakers, officials, businessmen and missionaries began to pay 
more attention to Singapore. This chapter will examine how the Spanish-
American War brought about these changes by contrasting the years before 1898 
with the period during and after the war. 
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Pratt and the “Splendid Little War” 
 Spain and the United States went to war towards the end of April 1898.68 
John Hay, then US Ambassador to London, described the conflict as a “splendid 
little war”. Although the Spanish-American War in the Pacific theatre mainly took 
place in the Philippines, Singapore’s central location allowed the US consul-
general at Singapore, Edward Spencer Pratt, to gather valuable war intelligence. 
Just before war broke out, the US State Department sent a circular to Pratt on 15 
April 1898, directing him “to watch and report the movements of Spanish ships 
of war” as they feared the Spanish government might “resort to privateering as a 
means of increasing its offensive sea power”.69 But even before receiving the 
circular, Pratt had sent a despatch to the State Department on 20 April 1898, 
entitled “Importance of Singapore at the present juncture from the fact of its 
being the port of call of Spanish steamers”. Pratt’s own assessment brought him 
to the same conclusion that the movements of Spanish vessels could be 
monitored from Singapore.70 
 
 Even before the war, Singapore’s strategic significance as a key port of call 
was noted by US officials. For instance, on 2 July 1897, the State Department sent 
a telegram to Pratt: “Cable if Japanese war ship Fuji arrives”.71 Construction of 
the Fuji-Kan had just been completed in England and it was expected to set off 
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for Japan thereafter.72 Washington was worried that the Japanese fleet would 
intervene in Hawaii, since Japan had protested strongly against the signing of the 
annexation treaty between the United States and Hawaii in June 1897.73 
Nevertheless, the Fuji-Kan did not deviate from its route and on 9 October 1897, 
Pratt cabled the State Department: “War ship Fuji arrived [at Singapore]”.74 A 
separate despatch was sent on the same day, reporting that the Fuji-Kan would 
“go on to Hong Kong and, after making a short stay there, proceed … to 
Yokosuka”.75 On 8 November 1897, another Japanese warship docked at 
Singapore and Pratt informed the State Department accordingly: “… [Yashima-
Kan] is expected, after coaling, to proceed to Hongkong and thence on to her 
destination in Japan”.76 Such reports on the movements of vessels, prior to 1898, 
were often limited to single ships and generally included the dates of arrival at 
and departure from Singapore, as well as the next destination. 
 
 The advent of the Spanish-American War was to intensify and expand the 
existing intelligence gathering efforts of the US consulate at Singapore. On 3 May 
1898, Pratt wrote to the State Department: 
I have the honor to submit for your consideration certain interesting 
particulars regarding Spanish Cruisers and Mail Steamers and Coal 
Deposits, Armament, Cable, Railways, etc. in the Philippines, which I 
succeeded in obtaining here and supplied to Commodore Dewey 
previous to his departure from Hong Kong, in addition to more urgent 
information concerning movements of ships, mining of channels, 
relieving of garrisonal posts…77 
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Commodore George Dewey was in command of the US Asiatic Squadron and such 
information was valuable in aiding the US squadron’s imminent battle against 
the Spanish fleet.78 Intelligence gathering was all the more crucial since there 
were eleven Spanish vessels against eight American ships.79 Considering that the 
information that the Navy Department had on the Philippines was more than 
twenty years old, Pratt’s intelligence was far more useful for their battle plans.80  
 
 The above despatch differed from Pratt’s previous reports in several 
aspects. First, the scope of intelligence collection was no longer restricted to a 
single vessel and had widened to encompass the entire Spanish fleet in the 
Philippines. Second, the content of the despatch was not just limited to the 
movements of vessels but also covered other aspects such as the armament of 
ships and the mining of channels. Third, intelligence gathered was also far more 
in-depth and comprehensive than before. For example, in Pratt’s report on the 
Reina Cristina, a Spanish cruiser, besides the specifics of the vessel, he noted: 
Although 14 knots is official speed, [Reina Cristina] can only do 12½ 
to 13. She is the best ship the Spaniards have out here, but must have 
suffered considerable deterioration to her guns which were made 
pretty free use of during bombardment of Cavite last year.81 
 
During this period, “the principal intelligence assets of the United States were 
diplomatic and consular reporting and the intelligence organisations of the Navy 
and War departments”.82 Since the US State and War Departments had yet to 
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develop its capability for espionage and covert operations, Dewey was very 
much dependent on intelligence from US consuls in the Pacific, including Pratt.83  
 
 Pratt also played a significant role in the Spanish-American War as he 
managed to secure the cooperation of Emilio Aguinaldo y Famy, a Filipino 
nationalist leader. Aguinaldo was part of the Katipunan, an anti-colonial secret 
organisation that aimed to overthrow the Spanish colonial authorities.84 In 1896, 
the leader of the Katipunan, Andrés Bonifacio called for a nationwide armed 
revolution in the Philippines.85 Responding to his call, Aguinaldo led a different 
faction of the Katipunan against the Spanish colonial authorities in Cavite and 
secured initial victories.86 But in March 1897, a power struggle among the 
Filipino revolutionaries broke out and led to Bonifacio’s death. Consequently, 
Aguinaldo took command of the rebel forces and continued the battle against the 
Spanish.87 But the Spanish managed to recapture the towns and Aguinaldo’s 
forces were forced to trek into the mountains of Bulacan province. A stronghold 
was established by Aguinaldo at Biak-na-Bato, and on 5 November 1987, he 
declared the Philippines independent and called on all Filipinos to fight against 
Spanish rule. 88 Aguinaldo’s forces in the mountains were soon ravaged by 
disease and hunger but the Spanish were far too weak to wipe out the rebels. 
With both sides suffering heavy casualties, a truce was eventually reached. On 15 
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December 1897, Aguinaldo signed the Truce of Biak-na-Bato and as a stipulation 
of the agreement he went into exile in Hong Kong.89 
 
 On 23 April 1898, Pratt was “confidentially informed” of Aguinaldo’s 
presence in Singapore, and a meeting was scheduled the very next day.90 Pratt 
was very impressed with Aguinaldo, describing him as “a man of intelligence, 
ability and courage, and worth the confidence placed in him”.91 Pratt also 
claimed that “no one … could exert on [the insurgents] the same influence and 
control that [Aguinaldo] could”.92 In a despatch to the State Department dated 28 
April 1898, Pratt reported: 
I took it upon myself whilst, explaining that I had no authority to 
speak for the government, to point out the danger of continuing 
independent action at this stage and having convinced him of the 
expediency of cooperating with our fleet then at Hong Kong and 
obtained the assurance of his willingness to proceed… I telegraphed 
the Commodore that same day… 93 
 
Pratt cabled Commodore Dewey: “Aguinaldo, insurgent leader here. Will come 
Hong Kong arrange with Commodore for general cooperation insurgents Manila 
if desired”.94 In reply, Dewey telegraphed: “Tell Aguinaldo come soon as 
possible”.95 Dewey was aware that he could not hold the city of Manila without 
sufficient troops and reinforcements would take time to arrive.96 Cooperation 
with Aguinaldo seemed to be a practical solution in the interim.97 As a result, the 
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trajectory of the Spanish-American War was altered as the Filipino 
revolutionaries became roped into an alliance with the US forces. 
 
 While the approaching war provided Pratt and Aguinaldo with a reason to 
cooperate with each other, the motivations of both actors should be explored as 
well. Pratt recognised the rare opportunity offered by the meeting with 
Aguinaldo and was eager to make the most of it. Pratt had previously served as 
US Minister Resident in Teheran (1887-1891) and the Court of the Shah at 
Teheran had been described as a “hotbed of political intrigue”.98 In contrast, 
when Pratt came to Singapore, he faced relatively dull and dreary tasks such as 
attending to shipwrecks. In December 1897, the American ship “Conqueror” was 
wrecked about sixty miles from Batavia and Pratt had to take care of the crew.99 
Settling estates of American citizens who passed away in Singapore was also part 
of Pratt’s job. Upon the death of Winthrop Hammond, Pratt notified the State 
Department: 
[Winthrop Hammond] arrived at Singapore as passenger on the 
American ship Benjamin Sewall, the 5th May 1897, was transferred to 
hospital on the 10th of that month and died there on 6th of the month 
following.100 
 
On 15 September 1897, Pratt finally transmitted to Washington: “the accounts of 
the Estate of the late Winthrop C. Hammond, of Concord”.101 Amidst such tedious 
and mundane duties, the secret meeting with Aguinaldo was hence a welcome 
distraction. 
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 Pratt was not the only one who stood to benefit from the alliance of 
Filipino and American forces. Aguinaldo saw this as a chance for the Philippines 
to get rid of Spanish rule by cooperating with the Americans. According to 
Aguinaldo’s recollection of the secret meeting, he purported that Pratt assured 
him that the United States would give them “much greater liberty and much 
more material benefits than the Spaniards ever promised”.102 Aguinaldo took a 
gamble and chose to believe that the United States would help to liberate the 
Philippines.103 At that time, Aguinaldo had little left to lose, especially after being 
exiled by the Spanish. It can even be argued that the alliance appeared to be 
more advantageous for Aguinaldo because it raised the possibility of Philippine 
independence. In the end, both Pratt and Aguinaldo decided to exploit each 
other’s motives to their advantage, though ultimately, the impending war was 
the precondition that set the stage for such an alliance. 
 
 The rapid unfolding of events that led to war meant that Pratt and 
Aguinaldo had very little time to ponder their options. Moreover, an act of 
Congress retroactively declared on 25 April 1898 that a state of belligerency had 
existed since 21 April 1898.104 The ambiguous manner in which the US 
administration went to war suggests that when Pratt persuaded Aguinaldo to 
join forces with the United States against Spain, he could not have known that 
war was certain but he took the risk anyway. Still, Pratt’s calculated and 
unauthorised action was not unusual for a consul-general, especially during this 
period. The US consular bureau was disorganised and had yet to be 
                                                        
102 Emilio Aguinaldo and Vicente Albano Pacis, A Second Look at America (New York: R. Speller, 
1957), p.33. 
103 Grunder and Livezey, The Philippines and the United States, p.24. 
104 Musicant, Empire by Default, p.190. 
25 
 
institutionalised, and there was no system in place to deal with urgent situations 
that the consuls faced.105 In the words of historian Benjamin Batson, in times of 
crisis, the US consul “could only act as he thought best, inform Washington, and 
hope that his course would be approved”.106 Pratt was a relatively experienced 
consular officer, who was probably aware that he could act autonomously due to 
slow and cumbersome communications between Washington and Singapore.107 
It took almost two months before the State Department received Pratt’s despatch 
on Aguinaldo and it was only on 17 June 1898 that the Assistant Secretary of 
State, William R. Day, telegraphed Pratt with instructions to “avoid unauthorised 
negotiations with Philippine insurgents”.108 By then, it was too late. Aguinaldo 
was already in the Philippines, fighting alongside the Americans against the 
Spaniards. 
 
 Pratt’s unilateral actions involving Aguinaldo came to the attention of the 
British colonial authorities in Singapore. In October 1898, Pratt received a 
despatch from the State Department stating that the British Ambassador at 
Washington, Julian Pauncefote, made a “remonstrance against [Pratt’s] entering 
into an agreement at Singapore with Aguinaldo for his uniting with Admiral 
Dewey in hostilities against Spain” in the neutral colony of Singapore.109 The 
British had declared neutrality on 25 April 1898, in part due to the lack of 
consensus of the European states, as they were torn between supporting Spain 
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and maintaining cordial relations with the United States.110 But Pratt excused 
himself on the neutrality issue by replying that his meeting with Aguinaldo was 
on 24 April, which was “before the Neutrality of this Colony had been 
proclaimed” on 25 April.111 He further explained that the Proclamation of 
Neutrality was “not transmitted to me until 26th April as [shown] from [the] 
enclosed copy of letter from the Colonial Secretary”.112 Pratt also assured the 
State Department that 
Port Authorities here can vouch for the fact that [he had] not only 
been most careful of [himself] in observing the provisions of the said 
Proclamation of Neutrality and Foreign Enlistment act but that [he 
had also] used special efforts to ensure their observance by others.113 
 
 
 The US consulate in Singapore came under the close scrutiny of the State 
Department again when Aguinaldo later claimed that Pratt gave him a verbal 
promise that the United States “would at least recognise the independence of the 
Philippines under the protection of the US Navy”.114 This is despite despatches, 
sent from Pratt to the State Department, which show Pratt maintaining that he 
informed Aguinaldo that he “had no authority to speak for the government”.115 In 
his despatch dated 20 June 1898, Pratt wrote that he “neither [has] nor had any 
intention to negotiate with the Philippine insurgents, and in the case of General 
Aguinaldo was especially careful to leave such negotiations to Commodore 
Dewey”.116 The following day, he sent another despatch stating that he was not 
having or proposing to have “any further dealings here with the Philippine 
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insurgents”.117 Pratt’s repeated denials and defensive stance imply that he 
sensed he may have overstepped his boundaries, and felt Washington may not be 
pleased with his proactive behaviour. In any case, the exchanges between Pratt 
and Aguinaldo during the meeting were never documented and became a matter 
of controversy. 
 
 The American press was generally unsympathetic towards Pratt and The 
Washington Post asserted that 
… [Pratt] interested himself rather actively in a matter quite outside 
of the Consular routine, and was in fact, conspicuously potent in the 
transaction which resulted in sending Aguinaldo back to Manila, 
where he has ever since been a nuisance and a menace.118 
 
An article published in the New York Times also claimed that 
The promises held out to Aguinaldo by United States Consul Pratt, 
Wildman, and Williams, promises that are now alleged to have been 
made without authority, would have been better if they had never 
been made.119 
 
The State Department grew displeased and told Pratt that the press articles have 
“occasioned a feeling of disquietude and a doubt as to whether some of your acts 
may not have borne a significance which this government would feel compelled 
to regret”.120 The eventual outcome was Pratt’s dismissal from the consular 
service. 
 
Sir Frank Swettenham’s Report 
 The possibility of acquiring the Philippines was present even before the 
Spanish-American War came to an end. Yet the US government lacked basic 
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knowledge of the Philippines and even their Navy Department files on the 
islands dated back to 1876.121 Even on the Asiatic station, most of the 
information was anecdotal, “blending scientific fragments with travellers’ 
tales”.122 Some US officials were thus compelled to turn to the consuls in the 
Pacific region, including Singapore, for information on the Philippines. Towards 
the end of 1898, there was a sudden flurry of information-gathering especially 
since the US was planning to take control of the Philippines. 
 
 The culmination of these efforts was The Philippine Islands, 1493-1898, a 
massive fifty-five volume set of documents edited by Emma Helen Blair and 
James A. Robertson.123 The volumes, published over several years, from 1903 to 
1909, are indicative of American attempts to learn more about their colony. The 
documents and accounts by the various explorers, missionaries and merchants 
provided information and statistics about the growth of the population and the 
development of various regions in the Philippines. The Philippine Islands was 
compiled 
with the intention and hope of casting light on the great problems 
which confront the American people in the Philippines; and of 
furnishing authentic and trustworthy material for a thorough and 
scholarly history of the islands. (emphases mine)124  
 
The selection of the various Spanish documents and manuscripts suggests that 
these great problems faced by the Filipinos were inherited from the Spaniards. 
The last volume of the series deals with the years 1841-1898 and, compared to 
the year 1600 which is covered in detail by 3 volumes. This poses the question of 
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how relevant the volumes were in providing Washington officials with an 
understanding of the problems that they faced. 
 
 Though the United States had yet to declare if they would hold on to the 
Philippine Islands, Washington was already busy gathering information on how 
to run a colony. As the United States had no prior experience in colonial 
governance, the US policymakers referred to other models of colonial 
administration and one of their case studies was British rule in Malaya and 
Singapore. Elihu Root, who would serve as US Secretary of War in 1899, turned 
to his collection of books on British colonial rule for guidance.125 Washington 
officials also “tried reading up extensively on British Malaya hoping to find 
guidance on how to run their similar tropical colony”.126  
 
 Before his dismissal, Pratt attempted to regain the favour of the State 
Department by collecting data on British administration of the Malay States. 
Pratt noted the “existing similarity of conditions” between British Malaya and the 
Philippines, and expressed his opinion that “in dealing with the Philippines, [the 
United States could] profit by England’s experience”.127 Possibly aware that 
Washington was collecting information on colonisation, Pratt took the initiative 
to compile a report on British Malaya. Pratt purportedly had “the most agreeable 
relations” with Sir Frank Swettenham, and wrote to him to procure the “specific 
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information necessary” for his project.128 In response, Swettenham put together 
a detailed report on British experience in the Malay States. This document, little 
known to scholars, has not been extensively analysed by historians thus far. 
 
 Swettenham wrote his report, dated October 1898, with the objective of 
providing guidelines and maybe even possible models of British colonies for the 
United States to adopt. His intention was reflected in the title of the thirty-eight 
page document: “England in Malaya: An Object Lesson”.129 Swettenham, the 
Resident-General of the Federated Malay States during this period, was 
described by Pratt as “one who has had such vast experience and been so 
eminently successful in dealing with Malay races”.130 A renowned Malay affairs 
specialist, Swettenham had picked up the Malay language in the early years of his 
career and was well-acquainted with the Sultans of the Federated Malay 
States.131 Swettenham’s report advised the US officials 
… to learn the language of the people to be ruled. I mean to speak it 
and write it well. And the first use to make of this knowledge was to 
learn as much as possible about the people – their customs, traditions, 
characters, and idiosyncrasies.132 
 
Nevertheless, the United States did the opposite and made English the official 
language and the medium of instruction in all public schools in the Philippines.133 
This was because many Americans had believed that they would be able to 
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civilise and uplift the Filipinos by bringing them American culture and 
language.134 American officials such as Fred Atkinson, the Director of Education 
in the Philippines, and his successor, David Barrows, also believed that English 
would foster a spirit of democracy in the islands.135 Hence, the Americans did not 
follow Swettenham’s advice in this matter. 
 
 Swettenham’s report began with the opening of China, indicating the 
paramount importance of the China market to the British.136 Swettenham then 
singled out Singapore’s significance to British interests in Asia: 
I call Singapore important and conveniently situated, because it is 
about equi-distant between Ceylon and Hongkong; because it 
commands the entrance to the China Sea, by the route of the Straits of 
Malacca; and because if, with Singapore as a centre, you describe a 
circle, with a radius of a thousand miles, that circle will cut, or include, 
Siam, Borneo, the edge of the Philippine group, the French 
possessions in Cochin-China, and the Dutch possessions in Java, 
Sumatra and the Malay Archipelago.137 
 
The fact that the report discussed Singapore right after the segment on China is 
indicative of Singapore’s crucial role to the British Empire in Asia. Singapore’s 
economic importance and history occupied almost one-fifth of the report, filling 
up seven pages in a document of thirty-eight pages. It was likely that 
Swettenham spent more effort in examining the port of Singapore with the 
expectation that the US colonial administration could apply some of the lessons 
to Manila. 
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 Aside from Singapore, the report focused on the Federated Malay States, 
which consisted of Perak, Selangor, Pahang and Negri Sembilan. Swettenham 
elaborated at length on British administration of these states before the creation 
of the Federation in 1896. The 1874 Pangkor Treaty was discussed and in 
particular, Clause VI and Clause X were highlighted in the document because of 
how they “practically placed the whole administration in the hands of the 
Resident”.138 In addition, Swettenham provided a brief description of the 
Resident system and the legal system, and included details of the various 
institutions ranging from state councils to courts of justices. He painted a bright 
picture of British administration in the Malay states, omitting how the British 
had no long-term plan on how to proceed.139 In fact, the British were so ill-
prepared to govern the Malay States that there had been no formulation of the 
specific duties of a Resident in 1875, which Swettenham had neglected to 
mention.140 Overall, the general impression given by Swettenham was that the 
British were able to handle the expansion of administrative control with little 
trouble.  
 
 Furthermore, Swettenham downplayed the 1875 assassination of British 
Resident James W. W. Birch by summarising the event in a single line.141 He 
conveniently leaves out the reasons behind the murder, overlooking popular 
interpretations that his death was an outburst against British authority.142 In 
response to Birch’s murder, punitive expeditions were carried out: 
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The first small expedition sent to punish the murderers [of Birch] met 
with disaster. A number of lives were lost, and a second force, 
consisting of troops from China and India, … attacked and captured 
the enemy’s strongholds, put those in arms to flight, occupied various 
strategic points, and,– while giving a very useful exhibition of 
England’s power, and the capacity of her soldiers and sailors to reach 
any Malay fastness,– furnished to the civil officers that material 
support which was necessary to enforce respect for their advice in 
trying to introduce a better form of government. (emphases mine)143  
 
It remains debatable whether the British introduced a “better form of 
government” to the Malays, since Swettenham’s views were clearly biased. 
Moreover, sending troops to enforce “respect” for the advice of British officers 
seems unwarranted. According to historian Barbara Andaya, the call for troops 
from India and Hong Kong proved unnecessary as there were probably no more 
than three hundred Malays under arms.144 The punitive expeditions were more 
likely a blatant demonstration of British ability to enforce their demands on the 
Malays.145 The excessive use of force to compel quiescence was mirrored in the 
Philippines, though the US forces did not achieve the same degree of success as 
the British.  
 
 British control of the Malay States was extended further with the Treaty 
of Federation in 1895. A main feature of the Treaty was the appointment of a 
Resident-General, and the Malay rulers promised to accept their advice in all 
matters of administration.146 As the First Resident-General of the Federated 
Malay States, Swettenham naturally focused on the benefits of the Federation in 
his report. He declared that the Federation was a “distinct success” because it 
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“has brought the Malay Rulers together and made them friends” and gave them 
“an increased feeling of importance and pride”.147 Besides this, the Federation 
“secured uniformity”, and brought about a higher standard of administration in 
all departments.148 The overwhelmingly positive remarks and the variety of 
separate matters that were covered in the report suggests that Pratt requested 
information on many issues such as how to craft a treaty with the natives, and 
how civil government was established in the Malay Peninsula. While there is no 
record of any questions that Pratt may have addressed to Swettenham, it can be 
inferred from the details of the report that Pratt probably inquired about how 
the British managed to subdue or pacify the Malay natives who rebelled and how 
the British ensured the continual control of the Federated Malay States.  
 
 In cases of revolts or rebellion, Swettenham recommended military force 
as the solution and explained: 
Up to this time, no white man had, since the beginning of time, ever 
gone into the Peninsula and tried to exercise authority there; 
secondly, that for many years, all these States had been in a condition 
of anarchy and strife, so that the only law, known or recognised, was 
that of ‘might” and, in its name, things were done that had better 
remain untold. (emphasis mine)149  
 
Swettenham did not expound on what he meant by things that had better remain 
untold, but following this passage, he continued: 
“Of minor, but still important, considerations, the following must be 
mentioned. In Perak, … [a] military expedition had vindicated the 
prestige of a power hitherto unfelt, and the existence of which was 
but vaguely realized. Some of those who opposed this power had been 
killed, others arrested, executed, imprisoned or deported.” (emphasis 
mine)150 
                                                        







He went on to state that the “circumstances Sungei Ujong were almost identical”, 
and in Selangor, the British made a naval demonstration and shelled some 
forts.151 Since these were regarded as ‘minor’ considerations by Swettenham, it 
prompts the question of what major undisclosed activities were carried out by 
the British in the Malay States. It is possible that the Americans picked up on 
these methods to exert control over the Philippines, as the US troops also 
committed brutal atrocities against Filipinos in the Philippine-American War. 
Though a small fraction of these incidents appeared in soldiers’ letters, 
newspapers and court-martial proceedings, much of the violence was left 
untold.152  
 
 Several pages of the document were filled with vivid illustrations of the 
character and personality traits of each racial group in Singapore and Malaya. 
Racial stereotypes were promulgated in Swettenham’s accounts and he gave 
fairly long comments about the Malays, Chinese and Tamils, detailing their 
perceived weaknesses and strengths. For instance, he stated that: 
The Malay hates labour, and contributes very little to the revenues in 
the way of taxation. He cultivates his rice fields, which he is made to 
do so by stern necessity, or the bidding of his headmen, and he is a 
skilful fisherman, because that is in the nature of sport.153 
 
Such attitudes were common as Social Darwinism theories were popular during 
this period. Race was often used to justify colonial control and much of British 
perspectives tend to portray the Malays to be in need of protection from racial 
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degeneration.154 Similarly, the Americans employed race to explain Filipino 
deficiencies and capacities and to advocate slow, gradual progress along the lines 
of assimilation and tutelage.155 
 
 Swettenham also stressed that the object of his report was to show that  
when the British Government at last consented to interfere in Malay 
affairs, the conditions of the problem to be solved were as complex as 
ingenuity could have devised. Further, that the means employed to 
grapple with this uninviting situation, and evolve order out of chaos, 
were entirely novel. Finally that the result obtained has been strikingly 
satisfactory. (emphases in original)156 
 
This implies that Swettenham felt the United States could benefit from tapping 
on British experience as the colonisation process was fraught with 
complications. The success of the British colonial model would provide a guide 
for the United States, thus simplifying the process for them. But Swettenham’s 
judgement of Britain’s satisfactory results may have been too hasty. It was only 
two years since the creation of the Federated Malay States and in 1898 the 
British were still expanding and consolidating their influence in Malaya.157 
 
 Swettenham also noted in his letter: 
There are two roads to possession and power, there may be more, but 
there are two at least; one is by force of arms and the ‘mailed hand’, - 
the other is by force of character and the exercise of certain qualities 
with compel respect and even sometimes win affection.158 
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This hints at how the United States may eventually embark on a different path 
from that of the British since there are two or more roads to possession and 
power. Swettenham would probably have figured out that the US administration 
may follow British imperial developments closely, but it would only selectively 
adapt elements of British colonial policy.159 Swettenham’s report also contained 
brief dismissive references to the Dutch Indochina colony in Asia, portraying it as 
an unpleasant and costly experience. 160 Naturally, he advised the US 
administration not to follow in the footsteps of the Dutch.161  
 
 More importantly, in an attached letter to the report, Swettenham offered 
the State Department his personal opinions on the Philippines. Swettenham 
expressed his belief that the Filipinos “would be easier to govern, because they 
have been for many years in contact with white men and understand their 
ways”.162 He cautioned that “they have aspirations for political institutions”, 
though he vaguely added that the Filipinos did not possess “the essential 
qualities to secure success”.163 Still, he opined that the British experiment in the 
Malay Peninsula “might be successfully repeated in the Philippines”, though he 
was emphatic that the United States should make it “clearly understood at the 
start that they meant to control and not only to advise and educate”.164 
Swettenham probably thought that the circumstances that the United States 
faced were similar to what the British faced in the past and felt compelled to 
                                                        
159 Kramer, The Blood of Government, p.11.  







offer some advice with the expectation that if the United States adopted the same 
methods, they could achieve the same outcomes. 
 
 On 16 December 1898, the State Department sent a short note to Pratt: 
…to acknowledge, with thanks, the receipt of your despatch No. 296 of 
November 1, last, transmitting an opinion of the Resident General of 
Singapore, in regard to the [Filipinos] and their government.165 
 
Washington’s official response to this document is not known and the extent of 
influence of this report on Philippine colonial governance remains unclear. 
Perhaps the US administration felt that the situation in British Malaya was quite 
different since there was no transfer of colonial authority, whereas the United 
States took over the Philippines from Spain. Nonetheless, considering the dearth 
of information that Washington had on the Pacific region, Swettenham’s report 
would be very helpful if it had been closely studied by US policymakers. In spite 
of Pratt’s efforts to contribute to the colonial enterprise through this document, 
the Aguinaldo controversy proved far too damaging to his reputation. Pratt was 
removed from his post shortly after the Spanish-American War ended.166 
 
Merchants and Missionaries 
 The Spanish-American War also impacted different sectors of Singapore’s 
economy in varying degrees. Due to war conditions, a naval blockade was 
imposed on the Philippine Islands by the US fleet.167 Two goods in particular 
were adversely affected by the blockade. The total value of cigars imported into 
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Singapore from the Philippines fell from $279,246 in 1897 to $174,586 in 
1898.168 Similarly, the total value of raw hides exported from the Philippines into 
Singapore dropped from $147,761 in 1897 to $57,568 in 1898.169 The overall 
value of imports into Singapore from the Philippines declined by about 10% 
from 1897 to 1898, and this drop was substantial, considering that the Spanish-
American War only lasted for a few months.170 
 
 Due to the war, Singapore’s commercial connections with the Philippines 
took on a different strategic significance as well. Though the total value of 
imports into Singapore from the Philippines fell, there was a marginal increase in 
the total value of exports from Singapore to the Philippines from $383,563 in 
1897 to $393,948 in 1898.171 This hints at the possibility that the United States 
was using Singapore as a supply base for the Spanish-American War in the 
Pacific theatre. Closer examination of trade statistics reveals that the total value 
of bread and biscuits exported from Singapore to the Philippines rose from 
$1,230 in 1897 by more than 600% to $9,055 in 1898.172 This data is interesting 
because rice was a Filipino staple, whereas bread and biscuits were usually 
consumed by Europeans and Americans.173 In addition, the naval blockade of the 
Philippines would have prevented the Spaniards from expanding their food 
supply. Considering both the timing and the extent of the sudden increase, it 
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stands to reason that the bread and biscuits were for the US forces in the 
Philippines, especially since few Americans resided in the islands then. The total 
value of stationery exported from Singapore to the Philippines in 1898 also grew 
by a hundred times as compared to that in 1897.174 As the Filipino population 
was largely illiterate, the increase in stationery imports was most likely for the 
use of American soldiers in the Philippines.175 Although the evidence is 
circumstantial, it strongly suggests that Singapore was supplying various goods 
to the US military forces in the Philippines in 1898. 
 
 Aside from Singapore’s trade with the Philippines, US-Singapore trade 
was also very much affected by the Spanish-American War. In 1898, the total 
value of exports from Singapore to the United States had risen by about 20% 
from the previous year to $18,102,748 in 1897.176 According to official US 
statistics and data, these growing figures were attributed to large increases in 
the export of tin, coffee and gambier, and to a lesser extent, gum copal and gutta 
percha.177 The total value of exports from the United States into Singapore also 
went up by 30% from the preceding year to $595,702 in 1898,178 with increases 
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in imports of wheat flour, machinery, lubricating oil and drugs and chemicals.179 
In 1898, the total value of exports from Singapore to the United States was about 
thirty times that of the total value of exports from the United States into 
Singapore. The trade imbalance between the United States and Singapore was 
consistent with the general pattern of expanding US-Singapore trade in the 
1890s.180 Since Singapore was a British colony then, the British Empire naturally 
took up the largest share of the Singapore’s import trade.181 
 
 Although US-Singapore trade was unaffected during the war, the 
aftermath of the Spanish-American War had an impact on exports from the 
United States into Singapore. Figure 1 clearly indicates that in 1899, the total 
value of imports into Singapore from the United States rose by 70% from the 
previous year to $1,022,724. Increases in petroleum, lard, tallow, metals, and 
clocks and watches contributed to this sudden growth.182 It seems that the 
acquisition of the Philippines drew the attention of American merchants to the 
economic potential of the Pacific, including Singapore. An article published in The 
Washington Post on 12 December 1898 asserted that  
More than a billion dollars’ worth of goods are every year imported 
into the countries commercially adjacent to the Philippine Islands, 
and more than half that amount is composed of the class of articles 
produced or manufactured in the United States and offered for sale by 
her people. Two tables just prepared by the Treasury Bureau of 
Statistics present some startling facts as to the consuming power of 
the countries in easy reach of Manila … 
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The importations into these four countries, Japan, China, British 
Australasia, and British India, and Straits Settlements, as above 
indicated, amount to nearly a billion dollars a year.183 
 
Furthermore, after the war, US-Singapore trade constituted almost 10% of 
Singapore’s total trade with the world, which was almost double that of 1896.184 
 
 Due to the Spanish-American War, the official presence of the United 
States in the Pacific was amplified as more US troops were sent to the 
Philippines. Simultaneously, unofficial interactions between the United States 
and Singapore expanded accordingly. In particular, more missionaries became 
eager to venture into the Pacific and this altered the expansion plans of the 
Singapore Methodist Mission. Methodist missionaries, led by James M. Thoburn 
and William F. Oldham, came to Singapore in 1885 to establish a mission 
station.185 While not all of these missionaries were American, almost all had ties 
of appointment, education and monetary support with the American Methodist 
Church.186 Thoburn soon realised that Singapore’s “chief importance from a 
missionary point of view” was “the fact that it [was] a doorway to … the great 
islands of the Malay Archipelago”.187 This view was shared by Oldham: 
If you will place the centre of a circle at Singapore, then with a 
diameter of twelve hundred miles sweep the surrounding lands with 
its circumference, you will hold within the circle a population of over 
forty millions of people.188 
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 Thus, by virtue of its strategic location, Singapore was perceived as a 
mission base for the Methodists to spread the gospel to the Malay Peninsula and 
the Netherlands East Indies.189 It is important to note that before 1898, the 
Methodists did not include the Philippines in their plans to expand the mission as 
Catholic Spain curtailed Protestant presence and activity in the islands.190 By 
1899, Spanish restrictions on Protestant movements were removed when the 
Philippine Islands became an American colony. This opened the door for the 
Protestant message to be preached in the Philippines, and the Methodists hastily 
sent Thoburn to Manila in 1899.191 
  
 Propelled by the events of the war, American missionaries became 
interested in spreading their mission to the Philippines and accordingly, 
Singapore grew in importance to the Methodist movement. Before 1898, 
Singapore was already an established base for Methodist mission work. As early 
as 1891, the Singapore Mission sent two missionaries, Daniel Moore and 
Benjamin Balderston to Penang to start Methodist work there.192 In 1895, 
Singapore missionaries sent William Horley to Ipoh to conduct evangelistic and 
educational work.193 American missionaries in Singapore also travelled to 
Sumatra and Java with the aim of planting new missions.194 Naturally when 
American Methodists were interested in spreading the gospel in the Philippines, 
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Singapore would serve as the missionary base for Methodist work among the 
Filipinos as well. This will be addressed in the next chapter. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Spanish-American War increased US involvement in the Pacific 
region and ushered in a period of change for US-Singapore interactions. 
Singapore was drawn into the Spanish-American War as a result of its close 
proximity to the Philippines as well as Pratt’s actions. The Spanish-American 
War expanded the functions of the US consulate-general at Singapore, and 
brought the American missionaries closer to setting up a mission in the 
Philippines. In August 1898, the United States and Spain signed the peace 
protocol. But negotiations dragged on because Spain objected strongly to the 
cession of the Philippines. Spain eventually handed the Philippines over to the 
United States in exchange for twenty million dollars.  The peace treaty was finally 
signed on 20 December 1898 and the United States became a colonial power. 
This signified that the United States was here to stay in the Pacific and this would 











Chapter Two: Turmoil at the Turn of the Century 
  
 Even after 1898, US-Singapore interactions remained affected by the 
subsequent tumultuous events in the Philippines. The Americans soon found out 
that acquiring title to the Philippines was a very different matter from physical 
control of the islands.195 Aguinaldo and his forces had fought hard against the 
Spanish troops to take over most of the Philippines, whereas the Americans only 
arrived for the siege of Manila.196 Having achieved so much through their own 
efforts, they had no desire to hand it all over to the Americans. But in late 
December, McKinley issued a proclamation that military government was to be 
extended to the Philippines and promised that US rule was one of “benevolent 
assimilation”.197 Aguinaldo responded with the declaration of the Philippine 
Republic on 23 January 1899, announcing that the Filipinos would defend the 
freedom they had won from Spain.198 Aguinaldo later accused Pratt and Dewey of 
reneging on their promises of Filipino independence when they first sought his 
cooperation.199 As neither side was willing to back down, tensions rapidly 
escalated and the Philippine-American War broke out on 4 February 1899.200 
The United States termed the ensuing struggle “the Philippine insurrection” to 
convey the impression that they were subduing a rebellion against lawful 
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authority.201 Large numbers of American troops were sent to the Philippines to 
establish US authority, and this resulted in an unprecedented expansion of US 
presence in the Pacific. In this chapter, I will explore how emerging colonial 
relations between the United States and the Philippines resulted in increasingly 
complex US-Singapore connections. 
 
The ‘Quadrangular’ Relationship 
 Pamela Sodhy’s The US-Malaysian Nexus: Themes in Superpower-Small 
State Relations stated that before 1945 the “US-Malayan relationship was 
triangular with the United States having to work through Britain”.202 Analogous 
to this, Singapore’s relationship with the United States was a three-way 
interaction between the United States, Britain and Singapore. However, I posit 
that this triangular relationship underwent a change as early as 1899, with the 
addition of a fourth player, the Philippines. 
 
 This quadrangular relationship between Britain, Singapore, the United 
States, and the Philippines surfaced when the Philippine-American War 
disrupted trade between the Philippines and Singapore. During the course of the 
war, the US Asiatic Squadron had established a temporary blockade of the 
Philippine Islands “in order to sever insurgent communications and the flow of 
arms to the Filipinos from abroad”.203 In May 1899, British vessels were 
prevented from trading with the Sulu islands.  Shortly after, on 2 June 1899, the 
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“Protocol, signed at Madrid on March 11th, 1877 [was] re-published for general 
information” in the Straits Settlements Government Gazette, an official publication 
of acts and ordinances in the colony.204 The 1877 Protocol had been signed 
between the Spanish, British and German governments to secure freedom of 
trade in the Sulu islands, and it was apparent that the motive behind the re-
publication of this Protocol was to inform the United States of the existence of 
such an agreement and to remind Washington that by taking over the 
Philippines, it had inherited Spain’s legal obligations.205 The consul-general at 
Singapore, Robert A. Moseley Jr., who was appointed as Pratt’s successor in 
January 1899, notified the State Department about the republication of the 1877 
Protocol with utmost haste on 3 June 1899.206 Subsequently, on 29 August 1899, 
London newspaper The Times reported: 
The [New York] Herald’s Washington correspondent telegraph[ed] 
that the United States authorities, although holding that the 
acquisition of the Sulu Archipelago by the United States [had] 
abrogated all treaties made between Spain and other countries 
relating to them, [had] decided not to place any trading restrictions 
on citizens of any other country having commercial interests in the 
islands.207 
 
On 15 September 1899, The Straits Times also stated that an “announcement was 
made at London on the 29th August that there will be no trading restrictions 
imposed in the Sulu archipelago”.208  
 
 In spite of this announcement, the steamer “Teresa” was refused entry to 
the Sulu islands on 23 October 1899.209 As a result, the Chinese shipowners in 
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Singapore hired lawyers to send a letter of complaint to the Singapore Chamber 
of Commerce.210 The Singapore Chamber of Commerce then referred this matter 
to the Colonial Secretary of the Straits Settlements: 
[The] Committee [of the Singapore Chamber of Commerce] trust the 
Government will see the advisability of communicating with the 
Home Authorities with the object of inducing the United States 
Government to remove these restrictions to trade with the Islands in 
the Sulu Archipelago.211  
 
The British Acting Colonial Secretary, E. G. Broadrick, wrote to Moseley: 
As the matter is one of considerable importance to the trade of 
Singapore, His Excellency, while not desiring to press any course 
which might hinder the consolidation of the new acquisitions of the 
United States in the Philippine Islands, would feel glad if the 
restrictions imposed by His Excellency General Otis could now be 
removed.212  
 
Nonetheless, on 14 November 1899, the US Military Governor of the Philippines 
General Otis sent a telegram stating: 
United States maintain that protocols Eighteen-seventy-seven [and] 
Eighteen-eighty-five granting free trade in Sulu archipelago expired 
with transfer of sovereignty by Spain. Sulu ports in same condition as 
other closed ports in the Philippines. Will remain so until trade 
regulations formulated.213 
 
It was only in February 1900 that Otis notified Moseley and the Colonial 
Secretary that the Sulu ports and Zamboanga were open to trade.214 
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 The quadrangular relationship was also evident in other instances, such 
as the issue of extending the Chinese Exclusion Act to the Philippines. On 21 July 
1899, Moseley purportedly sent a copy of the regulations on the exclusion of 
Chinese from the Philippines Islands to the Colonial Secretary’s Office.215 The 
Acting Colonial Secretary of the Straits Settlements, C. W. Kynnesley, then 
enquired about whether the regulations were “applicable to British subjects of 
Chinese descent” as  
I have not been able to discover any treaty with the United States of 
America whereby Great Britain has agreed to the exclusion from the 
United States of such Chinese as may be British subjects.216 
 
Moseley was stumped by this question and he asked the State Department if the 
exclusion act applied to the British subjects of Chinese birth.217 It was ten months 
before the State Department finally replied on 19 October 1900, stating that the 
exclusion of Chinese in the Philippines applied to “Chinese whether subjects of 
China or any other power”, and instructed Moseley to inform the Acting Colonial 
Secretary of the Straits Settlements.218 The State Department took so long to 
reply because “it was anticipated that the War Department would give an 
expression of opinion”.219 Since the Philippine-American War was still ongoing, 
the War Department was in charge of immigration matters in the Philippines. 
Perhaps the War Department’s reply was delayed since this was not a matter of 
military or strategic importance. 
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The Philippine Link in US-Singapore Interactions 
 As the quadrangular relationship developed, further links were forged 
between the United States and Singapore through the Philippines. Chapter One 
discussed how Washington policymakers looked towards the colony of 
Singapore for guidance. By 1899, even American officers stationed in the 
Philippine Islands became interested in studying how the British administered 
their colonies. For example, Brigadier General Robert P. Hughes of the Visayan 
Military District wrote to Moseley to request his help in obtaining “some 
authentic publication giving in as much detail as possible, the English Colonial 
System”.220 Interestingly, the Brigadier General had mistakenly thought that 
Singapore was part of India and labelled his letter accordingly.221 Furthermore, 
Major Goodale and Major Sweet, of the 23rd US Infantry stationed in the 
Philippines, were under the impression that Singapore was part of China, 
demonstrating that many Americans were ignorant about Singapore and the 
Pacific region in general.222 By 1900, the idea of modelling the Philippines after 
British Malaya became more widespread. On 1 July 1900, the Manila Times 
published an article titled “The Residential System and the Philippines”, 
asserting that the British system was “so strikingly successful in a not very far 
territory” and was “well worth examination”.223 
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 The Philippine Commission also expressed interest in learning more 
about how Singapore was administered by the British. The Commission was 
appointed by President McKinley in January 1899 to examine “the existing social 
and political state of the various populations” and “the legislative needs of the 
various groups of inhabitants”.224 It was tasked to determine “the measures 
which should be instituted for the maintenance of order, peace and the public 
welfare” as well.225 Thus, the Commission set out to learn the finer details of 
colonial administration; one issue looked into was custom duties. On 14 June 
1899, Moseley received a request: 
This Commission is desirous of obtaining information with reference 
to customs duties in several of the ports of the Orient, thinking that 
such information would be of assistance in its labors in this 
Archipelago…. will you kindly furnish (in printed form, if possible) the 
Tariff duties in various articles subject to duty at your port with the 
revenue derived therefrom, as well as those admitted free of duty.226 
 
Moseley replied on 5 July 1899 that the Singapore, Penang and Malacca were free 
ports and that there were “no customs or other duties on goods imported into 
these Settlements”.227 He explained that instead, there was “an excise duty on 
Spirits, Wines and Malt Liquors” and these, together with opium farming, 
constitute the larger portion of the revenue of the Straits Settlements.228 
 
 The contrast between Singapore’s free port status and the inflated tariffs 
of the Philippine ports contributed to the dawning realisation that the customs 
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duties at Philippine ports were atypically high in comparison to other Asiatic 
ports. On 26 July 1900, Moseley complained to the State Department that: 
…much adverse criticism has been expressed to me by Merchants in 
this Settlement, upon the prohibitory Tariff dues and other charges in 
force in the Philippines, which they allege to be more burdensome 
than during the Spanish occupation, and tend to greatly restrict the 
trade as well as retard the development of those Islands.229 
 
Instead of the usual reply from the State Department, William Howard Taft, head 
of the Second Philippine Commission, personally replied to Moseley’s despatch, 
suggesting that this matter was of high importance to the Commission. Taft’s 
letter stated: 
The injustices of the tariff which has been, and is now being collected 
at this and other ports of the Philippine Islands are well known to the 
Commission, and they expect to remedy them as soon after the first of 
September as it is possible for them to draft a law and make 
provisions for its enforcement. The Commission on the first of 
September will become the legislative body of the Islands, and then 
will assume the power to amend the tariff.230 
 
The slow process of tariff amendment implied that the United States was 
unprepared and had to adjust accordingly to the situation in the Asia-Pacific. 
 
 US officials soon realised that their colonial experiment could proceed 
more smoothly by referring to the experiences of other colonial powers. A 
valuable model of colonial administration was the British colony of Singapore, 
which was a thriving and prosperous port. Hence, when the Second Philippine 
Commission aimed to establish a civil government in the Philippines,231 the 
Philippine Civil Service Board sent a letter of inquiry to Moseley: 
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Will you kindly secure, if possible, and forward to me, for the 
information of the Board, any publication of the Singapore 
government relative to the civil service of that colony, - the character 
and scope of the examinations for entrance to the service; tenure of 
office; leaves of absence; hours of labor; method of making 
promotions, etc., etc.…This Board is now engaged upon the 
preparation of rules for carrying the civil service act into effect, and 
also upon preparation of a manual of information to applicants, and 
we would very much like to have the benefit of the experience gained 
the nearby colony of the Straits in the establishment and maintenance 
of its civil service.”232 
 
This inquiry reflected a new phase in the establishment of civil government, 
where internal administration was largely settled and the Board was moving on 
to “consider questions relating to the personnel of the service”.233 In response, 
Moseley enclosed the latest edition of the Revised Statutes, a volume of 
Singapore legislations in force.234 Despite initial interest in emulating 
Singapore’s civil service, US officials eventually dismissed it as they did not want 
to apply British standards to the Philippines. According to James A. Leroy, 
Secretary of the Philippine Commission, it was “entirely impracticable and 
undesirable to set up the British colonial civil service as a pattern for the 
Philippines”.235  
 
 This stemmed from the increasingly prevalent idea that American colonial 
enterprise in the Philippines was completely different from European 
imperialism and that the United States was attempting “something entirely new 
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to human history: not ‘empire’, but ‘expansive republicanism’; not colonial rule, 
but ‘tutelage in self-government’; not oppression, but ‘benevolent 
assimilation’”.236 These sentiments were expressed by Senator Joseph B. Foraker 
[Ohio], in a public address delivered on 22 September 1899: 
… our purposes are altogether beneficent. We do not want to oppress 
anybody or deprive anybody of self-government who is capable of it. On 
the contrary, to the fullest extent consistent with the maintenance of 
law and order, and the discharge of our internal obligations, and as 
rapidly as possible, the [Filipinos] … will be advanced in the 
enjoyment of freedom, liberty, independence, and self-government 
under the protection of the American flag. (emphases mine)237 
 
 Theodore Roosevelt, an influential politician who would become the US 
President in 1901, echoed these ideas in his speech on 2 September 1901 as he 
stated, “We are not trying to subjugate a people; we are trying to develop them 
and make them a law-abiding, industrious, and educated people, and we hope 
ultimately a self-governing people.”238 The exceptionalist rhetoric was also 
shared by missionaries and religious authority figures. Reverend Wallace 
Radcliffe, pastor of the New York Avenue Presbyterian Church in Washington, 
D.C., was one such religious spokesman who stated: 
Imperialism is in the air; but it has new definitions and better 
inventions. It is republicanism “writ large.” It is imperialism, not for 
domination but for civilisation; not for absolutism but for self 
government. American imperialism is enthusiastic, optimistic and 
beneficial republicanism….The peal of the trumpet rings over the 
Pacific. The Church must go where America goes.239 
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While exceptionalist depictions of US colonialism prevented the wholesale 
adoption of British colonial administration, American officials nevertheless 
continued to refer to Singapore for guidance on various administration matters.  
 
Spreading Methodism to the Philippines 
 The establishment of US military authority in the Philippines paved the 
way for American missionaries to spread their influence in the islands. The 
extension of Methodism to the Philippines tied American missionary work in 
Singapore to the Philippine Mission. Consequently, further connections between 
the United States, Singapore and the Philippines were created. Soon after the 
Treaty of Paris was ratified in February 1899, James Thoburn, an American 
missionary who established the Singapore Mission, arrived in Manila with the 
aim of looking over “possibilities of establishing Methodist mission work and 
[reporting back] to the missionary board” in New York.240 On 5 March 1899, 
Thoburn organised the first Methodist congregation in the Philippines at Teatro 
Filipino.241 By then, the Philippine-American War was underway and the first 
Methodist service was punctuated at intervals by the sound of rifle bullets falling 
on the zinc roof.242 On 12 August 1900, the first Filipino Methodist church in the 
Philippines was formed and named St Peter’s Methodist Episcopal Church.243 
 
 The organisation of the Methodist missions clearly illustrated that the 
Philippine Methodism was an offshoot of American missionary work in 
Singapore. Since the Philippine Mission was a branch of the Singapore-Malaya 
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Mission, the Philippine Islands District Conference, recognised in August 1900, 
came to be grouped under the umbrella of the Malaya Annual Conference instead 
of an independent mission conference. Missionary experiences in Singapore also 
helped to shape early Methodist work in the Philippines. Thoburn’s “injunction 
to open school work” served to guide the Philippine Mission244 and his words 
were rooted in the success of the educational mission in Singapore.245 Mission 
work in the Philippines mirrored that in Singapore with the establishment of 
Methodist institutions and structures, and the speed at which the Theological 
School and Mission Press were set up by 1901 indicates that the Philippines 
Mission was transplanting the Singapore experience.246  
 
 Spreading Methodism in the Philippines required funds as well as 
manpower. In 1900 the Philippine Mission received appropriations of $2,000, 
with promises of a further $5,000.247 Yet appropriations for salaries of 
missionaries in Singapore had been steadily reduced from $7,200 in 1899 to 
$5,560 in 1900 and it dropped even further to only $3,400 in 1901.248 Looking at 
the time period, it is likely that the reduction of disbursements to Singapore 
missionaries was linked to the diversion of funds to the Philippines. Moreover, 
the Mission Board in New York diverted missionaries from Singapore to the 
Philippines. For instance, J. L. McLaughlin, who initially volunteered for work in 
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Singapore, was sent to Manila in 1900.249 He described the situation in the 
Philippines: 
Having volunteered for work in Singapore, we were in Manila in 
obedience to order, and I soon found myself filling the anomalous 
positions of a Presiding Elder without a District, a Mission Treasurer 
without any funds, and Pastor of the English Church without a 
congregation other than a score of American soldiers and two or 
three faithful civilians.250 
 
In 1901, Methodist missionaries in Singapore reported that the “inadequacy of 
our missionary force and the utter inadequacy of the appropriations for our 
work render it impossible to give to the native work the supervision necessary to 
its success”.251 As a self-supporting mission, Singapore often encountered a lack 
of manpower and funds and extension of Methodism to the Philippines probably 
exacerbated the situation. Due to the establishment of the Philippine Mission as a 
subdivision of the Singapore Methodist Mission, much of the funds and personnel 
would naturally be drawn from the resources of the Singapore Mission. 
 
 However, the diversion of resources was not always from Singapore to 
the Philippines. A closer examination of the educational missions in Singapore 
and the Philippines shows that missionaries were also diverted from the 
Philippines to the Singapore Mission. Unlike the case of Singapore, missionary 
schools in the Philippines did not flourish due to the different colonial education 
policies implemented. In Singapore, British policy generally ignored the 
education of the immigrant population and the mission schools that provided 
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English education thrived.252 In contrast, the educational mission in the 
Philippines became untenable especially since American colonial policy 
established free public English schools in 1901.253 Not only did Methodist 
schools have to contend with the free American-run public schools, they also had 
to compete with the private Spanish schools for student enrolment because 
many of the Filipinos were pressured by their Catholic priests to stay away from 
Methodist schools.254 The Catholic Filipinos were hostile to the notion of 
Protestant schools, including Methodist schools, and its religious education.255 
Consequently, Methodist education in the Philippines faced many difficulties and 
the Girls’ School in Manila was discontinued in 1900.256 This benefited the 
Singapore Mission as Miss Cody, a teacher from the Girls’ School, was transferred 
to Singapore to help with kindergarten work.257 Clearly, the American Mission 
Board’s allocation of resources to the Singapore Mission was no longer 
determined solely by Singapore’s needs, but also by the requirements of the 
Philippine Mission. 
 
Trade and Other Consular Matters 
 In addition, developments in the Philippines played a role in expanding 
US-Singapore commerce. In 1899, the total value of imports from the United 
States to Singapore made a jump of 71% to $1,022,724 and continued to rise to 
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$1,415,913 in the following year.258 This was in part due to US acquisition of the 
Philippines as it directed the attention of American merchants to the potential of 
the Pacific region. As early as December 1898, newspapers reported on the 
“consuming power of the countries in easy reach of Manila”, such as the Straits 
Settlements and Hong Kong.259 Correspondingly, Moseley had received more 
letters sent by American merchants, expressing the desire to extend their 
business to Singapore; such companies included Excelsior Supply Co, a dealer in 
bicycles and B. Souto & Co., manufacturers of furniture.260 Another reason for the 
increase of American imports into Singapore was the rapid industrialisation of 
the United States. By the end of the nineteenth century, the United States had 
become the world’s leading exporter of domestic products.261 American 
industrialisation also explains the 12% increase in the total value of exports from 
Singapore to the United States in 1899 to $20,268,807 as the United States 
imported raw materials such as tin from Singapore.262 Tin was an important 
commodity during this period as American dairy and petroleum industries were 
shipping their products in tin containers and tin plate was used in food-canning 
industries.263 In 1900, the total value of exports from Singapore to the United 
States fluctuated and fell slightly by 4% to $19,441,353.264 
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 Singapore’s trade was affected by the Philippine-American War as well. 
There was a 30% drop in the total value of imports into Singapore from the 
Philippines in 1899 due to the blockade of Philippine ports during the war.265 It 
was only in 1900 when the ports were gradually opened that the total value of 
imports into Singapore from the Philippines increased fourfold to $1,495,716.266 
As with the Spanish-American War, Singapore was probably a supply base for 
the American troops during the Philippine-American War too. The total value of 
bread and biscuits, which were typically consumed by Americans, exported from 
Singapore to the Philippines increased by 3.5 times to $5,498 in 1899.267 
Similarly, the total value of butter and cheese also rose by approximately 450% 
in 1899.268 Traders in Singapore also supplied the Filipino forces with 
ammunition during the initial phase of the war.269 Singapore was thus providing 
supplies to both sides during the Philippine-American conflict, causing a tenfold 
increase in the total value of exports from Singapore to the Philippines from 
$393,948 in 1898 to $3,912,524 in 1900.270 
 
 Though Singapore’s trade with the United States and the Philippines 
flourished during this period, Washington did not appear to be aware of it and 
paid little attention to Singapore. Records of consular despatches showed that 
Moseley did not transmit any records or accounts of US trade with the Straits 
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Settlements to the State Department.271 A scrutiny of the Commercial Relations of 
the United States with Foreign Countries During the Year 1900, a compilation of 
consular reports published in 1901, also revealed that: “No statement [was] 
available as to [US] trade with the Straits Settlements in 1899”.272 Sending “to the 
State Department quarterly reports and annual reports about the commercial 
activity at Singapore” was a basic consular duty that Mosley had failed to fulfil.273 
Moreover, the Straits Settlements Blue Books of 1899, a publication on Straits 
Settlements statistics and data, was printed by 1900, and Moseley would have 
access to US-Singapore trade statistics then. It is possible that Moseley had been 
more preoccupied with other matters, especially those pertaining to the 
Philippines, and trade reports had slipped his mind. His poor health towards the 
end of 1900 could also have affected his consular duties. Regardless, there was 
no evidence that the State Department had reprimanded Moseley for failing to 
deliver the trade accounts. Since US-Singapore trade constituted less than 1% of 
total US trade with the world, it could explain why Washington officials did not 
pursue this matter any further.274 
 
 Various groups of Americans appear to have differing points of view on 
the importance of Singapore to their interests. For example, Washington was 
more concerned with establishing their presence in the Philippines during this 
period and Singapore was merely a peripheral concern, as exemplified by the 
poor condition of the consulate-general office. Moseley required authorisation 
from the State Department for the purchase of basic items for the consulate 
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office, such as a telephone,275 a call bell and a padlock.276 Moseley also asked to 
hire a night watchman on 27 October 1899.277 When his piecemeal requests for 
basic amenities were granted, Moseley then requested for some publications to 
establish a small library on 10 March 1900.278 Following that, he asked for a 
typewriting clerk on 3 May 1900.279 Moseley slowly built up his demands, and 
after his request was granted, he would ask for a different resource, and this 
strategy possibly made the State Department more amenable to his requests. The 
above requests made by Moseley demonstrated that there was increasing 
consular work and that more people were utilising the services of the consulate, 
hence the need for more resources and personnel. 
 
 In contrast to Washington’s views, some American exporters and traders 
started to notice Singapore’s rising importance, especially within the Pacific 
region. On 26 January 1899, the New York Times published an article that briefly 
commented on 
…the really disgraceful appointment [the President] has just made to 
the Consulate at Singapore, suddenly become of great [n]ational and 
international importance, of a common-place office-hunting politician 
of no pretense of special fitness for the place.280 
 
The “office-hunting politician” was clearly referring to Moseley, who was 
appointed by President McKinley probably as a favour to Thomas Brackett Reed, 
Speaker of the House of Representatives. Moseley and Reed were acquainted 
when Moseley was the chairman of the executive committee of the Republican 
                                                        
275 Despatches, 21 September 1899. 
276 Despatches, 25 October 1899. 
277 Despatches, 27 October 1899. 
278 Despatches, 10 March 1900. 
279 Despatches, 3 May 1900. 
280 New York Times, 26 January 1899. 
63 
 
Party from 1888 to 1986 and they were sufficiently close that Moseley used his 
influence with Reed “to secure appropriations of public lands for the Girl’s 
industrial school at Montevallo, for the University of Alabama, and for the negro 
institute at Tuskegee”.281 Moseley’s lack of consular experience, coupled with his 
little knowledge of the Asia-Pacific, made him a poor choice. However, to the 
State Department, Moseley might have been an ideal candidate. Moseley’s 
predecessor, Pratt, was an experienced consular officer and had some knowledge 
of the Pacific but his secret negotiations with Aguinaldo ultimately caused 
trouble for the US administration. In view of this, the State Department might 
prefer someone like Moseley, who would consult closely with them about 
consular matters. 
 
 Furthermore, the New York Times article above described Singapore as 
“suddenly” becoming important both in the national and international sphere. 
The sudden change coincides with the Philippine-American War, and implies a 
link between events in the Philippines and Singapore’s increasing importance. 
The newspaper did not seem to subscribe to Washington’s perception of 
Singapore as unimportant and seemed to reflect the general opinions of 
American merchants and businessmen, especially since New York City was the 
chief financial and commercial centre of the United States. Thus, the 
establishment of American presence in the Philippines was the key to propelling 
the deepening of commercial ties between the United States and Singapore 
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 In a tragic turn of events, Moseley passed away on 14 November 1900 
and his successor, W. Irvin Shaw of Pennsylvania, committed suicide before he 
even arrived in Singapore.282 The consulate temporarily fell to the charge of the 
acting vice consul-general, John Macbeth Campbell and there was minimal 
disruption to US-Singapore interactions. During the short time that Moseley was 
in charge, the structure of the US-Singapore relationship had evolved to 
incorporate the Philippines, and such a change affected the political, economic 
and social aspects of their relationship. The Philippine-American War helped to 
crystallise this wider interaction and cement links between the United States, 
Singapore and the Philippines. Tensions were also starting to develop between 
Washington officials and American merchants over Singapore’s importance to 
the United States. With the establishment of American authority in the 
Philippines, the United States changed from being a spectator in Pacific affairs to 
an active player with a growing stake in the Pacific region. The shift in US role in 
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Chapter Three: Growing Connections 
 
 On 23 March 1901, Aguinaldo was captured by General Frederick Funston 
and the US administration thought the war was over.283 Soon after, Aguinaldo 
issued a proclamation on 4 April 1901 “calling on the guerrillas to lay down their 
weapons and the Filipino people to accept United States authority”.284 Though 
some Filipino combatants obeyed Aguinaldo’s call, others refused to submit to 
US authority and sporadic fighting surfaced in various parts of the Philippines 
over the years. Nonetheless, on 4 July 1901, military rule came to an end and 
civilian government was established in the pacified provinces.285 The Philippine-
American War was officially declared over on 4 July 1902 by US President 
Theodore Roosevelt, who took office after McKinley’s assassination.286 As peace 
and stability were gradually restored in the Philippine Islands, American officials 
focused more of their attention on colonial institutions and administration. This 
chapter will delve into the web of connections between the Philippines, the 
United States, and Singapore to shed more light on how the regional context 
expanded US-Singapore interactions during 1901-1904. Additionally, 
developments in the international arena that influenced the growth of US-
Singapore ties will also be studied. The complexity of these changes will be 
illustrated by exploring the different facets of Singapore’s relationship with the 
United States. 
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Singapore and the Philippine Experiment 
 From 1901 to 1904, American colonial authorities came to view 
Singapore as an important case study for their Philippine experiment. This was a 
subtle shift from how the US administration used to perceive Singapore as a 
general reference for guidance in colonial matters. American officials were 
moving towards a more empirical approach in colonial governance as scientific 
and academic discourses were slowly pervading the policymaking process in the 
Philippines.287 In the words of historian Warwick Anderson, the “economic and 
political aspects of American colonialism in the Philippines had been rapidly 
translated into the language of medical science” during this period.288  
 
 Accordingly, the instructions given to US officials reflected the increasing 
prevalence of scientific processes and terminology. This change can be observed 
in the letters sent from the American colonial authorities to Oscar F. Williams, 
who assumed his duties as US consul-general at Singapore in April 1901.289 
Williams received instructions on 21 July 1901 to procure a copy of municipal 
laws “especially with reference to the method in which the question of opium, 
bawdy-houses, saloon, etc., [were] handled”.290 On 2 January 1903, a more 
specific request was sent to Williams: 
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The Civil Commission, which is the legislative authority in the 
Philippines Islands, is now considering the question of regulating the 
traffic in opium, with the double object of securing revenue and 
restricting the evils of the trade.…We desire to study the laws upon 
this question as now in force in the Oriental possessions of Great 
Britain, that we may profit from the experience of those who, for 
many years, have been dealing with the question in a practical way.291 
 
Compared to earlier inquiries, these requests were much more exact and precise 
in outlining the type of information desired. Aside from this, the queries clearly 
outlined the objectives of the investigation, in a similar way to how scientific 
studies were conducted at this time. Over time, even newspaper reports on US 
policy tours in the Asia-Pacific contained scientific vocabulary such as “observe”, 
“ascertain”, “methods” and “investigation”.292 
 
 At a time when science lent power and legitimacy to public policy, 
American scientists and officials regarded the Philippines as a laboratory for US 
colonial policy.293 Accordingly, US officials saw Singapore as a suitable site for 
fieldwork, where observations and data collection could be carried out to 
contribute to the success of their Philippine experiment. In August 1903, an 
Opium Commission was appointed to visit countries in Asia, including Singapore, 
to “ascertain the methods of regulation and control”.294 The US Opium 
Committee discovered that while Singapore laws were supposed to prevent the 
spread of the opium habit, they were ineffective because there were numerous 
simple ways to evade restrictions.295 US officials involved in formulating the 
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opium policy in the Philippines “took every opportunity to learn from the 
successes and failures in neighbouring colonies”, including Singapore.296 In 
another instance, General Leonard Wood, who commanded the Philippines 
Division, was directed to visit Singapore on a tour of observation in March 1903 
to observe the “methods of other powers in the employment of native forces”.297 
His investigation would help in determining if the United States should merge 
the native forces with the regular army or keep them separate in the 
Philippines.298 
 
 The scientific processes of US colonialism also extended to the creation of 
new industries in the Philippines. When American colonial authorities were 
planning to develop a rubber industry from scratch in the Philippines, they 
turned to Singapore for information and data.299 On 7 November 1903, the State 
Department sent a circular to consul-general Williams requesting for: 
[…] detailed reports of any experiments which have been made within 
your respective districts or vicinity in the cultivation of the “Para-
rubber” tree or other varieties of rubber-producing plants, the 
methods of cultivation, area now occupied, number of trees, and such 
other facts as would likely be of value or importance to those 
contemplating this industry in the Philippine Islands.300 
 
Yet despite having collected information about the basic technicalities of rubber 
cultivation from Singapore, the rubber experiment in the Philippines met with 
failure after failure.301 One possible factor was the difference in climates as in 
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contrast to Singapore, rubber plantations in the Philippines were often exposed 
to typhoons.302 Other reasons included labour issues and the poor selection of 
seed.303 Therefore, studying Singapore’s methods did not necessarily guarantee 
the success of the Philippine experiment since in reality, not all variables could 
be controlled. 
 
The Expansion of the Methodist Mission 
 The establishment of American rule in the islands not only led to 
increased official US presence in the Pacific, but also brought about an influx of 
American missionaries in the Philippines. With the pacification of the islands, the 
Methodists started to carry out their mission work among the Filipino 
population. Like the American officials, the Methodist missionaries came to 
realise the importance of their experience in Singapore in helping the Philippine 
Mission. An experience that was applicable to the Philippines was the institution 
of the mission press. The role of the printing press in mission, evangelism and 
education has always been a significant one.304 The Methodist Press in Singapore 
was established since 1891, and from 1900, it expanded its printing and 
publishing operations, making it an important financial asset of the mission.305 In 
1901, the Methodists set up the Thoburn Press in Manila and it was described as 
“small, but thoroughly first class”.306 By 1903, there appeared to be a conflict 
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between the Thoburn Press and Singapore’s Methodist Press. Philippine 
Methodists reported in February 1903: 
At the last District Conference, it was decided to withdraw the 
[Thoburn] Press from commercial work and devote it entirely to the 
printing of our own literature exclusively…. We firmly believe that the 
Mission has no business to enter into the competitive printing of such 
a class of work as [it] puts us on a plane with the cheap labour of the 
Orient. There can be no legal motive for the expenditure of missionary 
money in the support of such a work. Further, for every dollar taken 
in payment for such work, we believe that a much greater sum is lost 
to the general economy of our work.307 
 
This view ran contrary to that of the Methodist Press in Singapore. Even though 
the key objective of the Methodist Press had been to “provide for the more 
effective production of religious literature”, the Singapore Mission Press needed 
to take on commercial orders so as to achieve its aim of being self-supporting.308  
 
 Yet soon after the announcement from the Thoburn Press, the 
missionaries realised their mistake when they discovered that the mission press 
was untenable without the income generated by commercial printing. As W. T. 
Cherry, publishing agent of the Singapore Mission Press, explained: 
We have studied thoroughly the problem of doing only religious 
work, and are free to say that our Press cannot be run of those lines. 
The work would not be sufficiently steady in quantity, nor profitable 
financially, for us to exist. If we are to produce religious literature 
cheaply, we must have either an endowment or a self-supporting 
trade.309 
 
Cherry spoke from experience as the Mission Press in Singapore had been 
printing religious literature at a financial loss, but as they were interested in 
continuing those papers, they had to find another source of revenue to 
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compensate for the losses.310 The Thoburn Press eventually recognised that they 
could not sustain the mission press on religious work alone and in 1904, they 
“ventured upon a partially commercial programme”.311 
 
 However, at times, the Methodist experience in Singapore had limited 
applicability. The different conditions of Singapore and the Philippines meant 
that the Methodists had to adopt various means to spread their mission. In 
Singapore, British policy after the Treaty of Pangkor in 1874 discouraged 
Christian evangelical efforts among the Malays and consequently, Christian 
missions focused the bulk of their efforts on the Chinese and Indian 
population.312 In contrast, there was no such colonial policy in the Philippines 
and the Christian missions envisioned spreading their gospel to all the Filipinos. 
The desire of the Christian missionaries to save Filipino souls was manifested in 
the formation of the Evangelical Union in 1901. The Evangelical Union, 
comprising representatives of seven missionary and Bible societies, divided up 
the Philippine Islands and assigned specific geographical areas to the various 
participating missions.313 The immense scale of the missionary enterprise in the 
Philippines and the lack of US attention to religious affairs contributed to the 
rapid growth of the Philippine Mission. 
  
 Tensions also arose with the expansion of Methodism as the growth of the 
Philippine Mission took place at the same time as the Methodists in Singapore 
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were opening new mission fields in the Malay states. In 1901, the Singapore 
District only comprised the mission stations of Singapore and Malacca.314 By 
1903, the Singapore District had widened to encompass Kuala Lumpur and 
Borneo.315 The inclusion of Borneo was significant because it lay beyond the 
Malay Peninsula. This signalled that the Methodist Mission was spreading to the 
Malay States as well as the Netherlands East Indies. By 1904, two new outreach 
stations in Seremban and Sungai Besi were opened and placed under the charge 
of the Singapore District.316 The concurrent expansion of the Singapore and 
Philippine Missions meant that they would be competing with each other for 
more funds and manpower, which were unfortunately in short supply. Yet in 
spite of the “inadequacy of [the] missionary force and the utter inadequacy of the 
appropriations” for the Singapore Mission in 1901, new mission fields were 
continuously opened as the missionaries worked tirelessly to spread the 
gospel.317 
 
Regional and International Influences in US-Singapore Trade 
 The rivalry between Singapore and the Philippines was not only in the 
missionary sphere, but also extended to the economic aspects. By 1901, Manila 
appeared to challenge Singapore’s commercial importance to the United States. 
Right from the start, US acquisition of the Philippines, together with Guam, Wake 
and Hawaii, was largely aimed at “the domination of the fabled China market”.318 
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In order to do so, Manila had to contend with the established ports of Hong Kong 
and Singapore to capture a sizeable share of the Orient trade. The belief in 
Manila’s potential to rival Singapore was espoused by John Barrett, who was US 
Minister to Siam from 1894 to 1898. Barrett had first-hand knowledge about 
Philippine affairs as he worked as a war correspondent in the Philippines during 
the Spanish-American War.319 As a staunch advocate of US acquisition of the 
Philippines, his articles often trumpeted the importance of the Philippines to the 
US-Orient trade.320 Barrett remarked in a New York Times article: 
The great highway of commerce in the Orient passes through the 
South China Sea right past the whole western shore line of the 
Philippines. Manila is even in a better location than Hongkong or 
Singapore to control this from a naval standpoint.321 
 
William Taft, head of the Second Philippine Commission, also expressed 
confidence that “Manila [would] become one of the great ports of the Orient”.322 
Barrett may have exaggerated Manila’s significance to the Orient trade, but he 
was partially right in that Manila did provide some measure of competition to 
the port of Singapore. 
 
 At times, the US businessmen in the Philippines took advantage of the 
decline of enterprises in Singapore to build new Philippine business sectors. 
Singapore had been a “large producer of Coco-nut oil both for local consumption 
and for export” until 1903 when the United States placed a heavy import duty on 
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refined coconut oil from Singapore.323 Apparently, Singapore’s coconut oil “was 
successfully competing on the Pacific Coast with American lard” and the US 
government was pressured to protect its domestic industries.324 Not only was a 
heavy import duty placed on Singapore’s coconut oil, all outstanding contracts 
with the Singapore refinery were cancelled as well.325 At the same time, 
American lard was allowed to enter the Straits Settlements free of duty and kill 
the local demand for coconut oil.326 This spelt the end of the coconut oil industry 
in Singapore, and the local company was “obliged to sell its plant to a firm on the 
American seaboard”.327 Coconut oil, generally used for cooking and 
manufacturing purposes, would rapidly be replaced by other substitutes such as 
butter, lard or palm oil. The loss of an entire industry would have a significant 
impact on the Singapore economy, even though coconut oil was not a key export. 
As observed in the newspaper article, “the Straits Settlements have lost what has 
cost a great deal to create, and what would have been very valuable in the 
future.”328 
 
 Shortly after, American businessmen in the Philippines began to realise 
the potential of developing a coconut oil industry in their own colony. With the 
cessation of the coconut oil refinery in Singapore in 1903, they would face 
relatively little competition in this industry. On 31 March 1905, the Straits Times 
reported: 
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The vast extent of coconut growth in the [Philippine] islands now 
possessed by the United States government will benefit the [coconut] 
oil business in years to come. Americans are fast getting control of the 
richly paying groves, and with modern machinery will be able to make 
the coconut production a feature in the oil industry of the world.329 
 
Unlike in the case of Singapore coconut oil, Philippine coconut oil would be 
managed under American businesses. This meant that the US government not 
only had to protect the interests of the American lard industry, but also to ensure 
that tariffs imposed would not put an end to a growing coconut oil industry. The 
shift of the coconut oil industry from Singapore to the Philippines was driven by 
American business interests and Singapore’s loss turned out to be the 
Philippines’ gain.  
 
 Colonial policy implemented by the Manila authorities also interfered 
with Singapore’s trade. The value of imports entering Singapore from the 
Philippines increased rapidly from $491,657 in 1901 to $2,344,100 in 1903.330 In 
contrast, exports from Singapore to the Philippines dropped from $3,667,230 in 
1901 to $1,267,321 in 1904.331 According to the Annual Report of the Straits 
Settlements, it was in part due to the high duties imposed by the Philippines.332 
This can be traced back to Article IV of the Treaty of Paris: 
The United States will, for the term of ten years from the date of the 
exchange of the ratifications of the present treaty, admit Spanish 
ships and merchandise to the ports of the Philippine Islands on the 
same terms as ships and merchandise of the United States.333 
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Hence, the US colonial authorities maintained the tariffs on American products 
entering the Philippine markets because otherwise, “a corresponding adjustment 
would have had to be made for Spain”.334 Consequently, duties were also 
imposed on other foreign goods imported by the Philippines as a measure to 
protect US exports from competition within the Philippine market. American 
commercial interests in the Philippines were thus safeguarded at the expense of 
the distortion of the Philippine economy. 
 
 However, the relationship between the ports of Singapore and Manila was 
not simply characterised by competition. Trade statistics indicate that their 
relationship was complementary in some aspects. With the Philippine-American 
War slowly coming to an end, the value of Philippines exports to the United 
States increased exponentially from $2,572,021 in 1901 to $13,863,059 in 
1903.335 The sheer magnitude of this increase can be explained by the Tariff Bill 
of 1902 where the duty on Philippine exports to the United States was reduced 
by twenty-five percent.336 More importantly, Philippine goods that were greatly 
desired in the American market were on the free list, including hemp and 
coconut.337 The Tariff Bill of 1902 resulted in the massive flow of Philippine 
goods, especially hemp and coconut, into the American market. Yet at the same 
time, the value of exports from Singapore to the United States grew steadily from 
$23,387,789 in 1901 to $26,449,073 in 1903.338 The simultaneous growth of 
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both Philippine and Singapore exports to the United States showed that 
Philippine goods did not replace Singapore products in the American market as 
the Philippines and Singapore were producing different goods. Singapore’s 
principal exports consist of tin, gambier, rubber, coffee and spices, whereas 
Philippine main exports include hemp, tobacco, sugar and copra.339 Although 
Manila offered the possibility of rivalling Singapore in the Orient trade, the 
expansion of US trade in the Pacific region ironically drew attention to 
Singapore’s commercial importance and viability in the region. 
 
 Apart from regional developments, changes in the international arena 
also paved the way for the development of closer commercial ties between the 
United States and Singapore. In 1901, US exports of domestic goods surpassed 
those of Britain’s, marking the beginning of the gradual decline of Britain’s 
industrial position.340 British share in Singapore’s trade with the West slowly fell 
from 53% in 1900 to 35% in 1915, and the US share in Singapore’s trade 
correspondingly increased from 18% in 1900 to 45% in 1915.341 This change led 
economic historian Wong Lin Ken to remark that “[a]lthough a port within the 
British Empire, Singapore was increasingly more important for the United States 
than Britain”.342 After 1901, many American businessmen who became 
interested in exporting their goods to Singapore wrote to US consul-general 
Williams asking for advice or help. They expressed interest in exporting 
merchandise such as footwear, lighting, lamps, crockery and printing 
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machines.343 Cotton was another commodity that the United States was keen on 
exporting, and according to Williams, American cotton goods were popular and 
“most favourably received”.344 With the rapid industrialisation of the United 
States, American manufactures needed new markets. The United States also 
sought tin and other raw materials from Singapore. These developments set the 
stage for the United States to deepen their commercial interests in Singapore 
after 1900. 
 
 But in their efforts to expand trade with Singapore, some American 
businessmen came into conflict with British authorities in Singapore. By 1900, 
US industrial demand for tin grew so large that it “had become the decisive factor 
in the market”.345 To supply the American tin-plate industry with the cheapest 
tin, the International Tin Company (ITC), an American corporation, sought to 
purchase Malayan tin ore and smelt it in the United States.346 However, the 
British suspected that the aim of the ITC was to “seize control of Malayan tin and 
British tin-plate industries” and monopolise the smelting of tin.347 Frank 
Swettenham, the Governor of the Straits Settlements, warned the ITC 
representative, Mr R. F. Pearce, that the British government would take action if 
the company attempted to export tin ore to the United States.348 On 1 June 1903, 
the Federated Malay States legislature passed a law that imposed a prohibitive 
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tax of thirty dollars per picul on tin ore export to countries outside the Colony.349 
The extra duty was, in Williams’s words, “aimed to kill the American smelting of 
tin ore”.350 It was a major deterrent to the ITC and safeguarded Singapore’s tin-
smelting industry as much of Malayan tin was smelted in and exported through 
the port of Singapore. 
 
 Although the prohibitive tax thwarted ITC’s attempt to smelt tin ore in the 
United States, it nevertheless ensured the growth of US-Singapore trade since the 
United States had to continue to import large quantities of tin from Singapore for 
their industrial needs. By October 1903, Williams was compelled to report to the 
State Department: 
No change is likely soon to occur because the great influence of the 
[Straits Trading] Co. here and the pride of the British Government in 
which apparently the restriction duty has its initiative will both 
support the measure.351 
 
This matter was sufficiently important to warrant the attention of the 
Washington administration, which filed a protest with the British government 
about the prohibitive tax in 1904.352 It was to no avail as the British deemed it 
important to protect value-added activities such as smelting works.353 Had the 
ITC succeeded in procuring Malaya’s tin ore, American businessmen “would have 
consequently obtained control of the entire industry in Malaya and thus been 
able to control the price of tin”, since more half of the world’s demand for tin was 
supplied by Malaya.354  
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 US interests in Singapore’s growing canned pineapple industry were 
similarly important that the American government got involved yet again. In the 
early 1900s, the Hawaiian canned pineapple industry was just starting to 
develop and the bulk of canned pineapple imported by the United States came 
from the Bahamas and Singapore.355 In 1901, Singapore had at least forty 
pineapple canneries and the United States imported about 50,000 cases of 
canned pineapples from Singapore in that year.356 Canned pineapples were 
marketed as a luxury good in the United States since the tropical fruit was not 
native to American soil and few Americans found it affordable.357 In 1902, the US 
government instructed Williams to “ascertain by proper tests the average normal 
amount of cane sugar and total sugar” in Singapore pineapples as higher duties 
were imposed on canned pineapples that had cane sugar added.358 Williams 
personally visited several of the largest canneries in Singapore and concluded 
that because of different sugar levels, there was a significant difference of 
$40,000 in tariffs paid for pineapples preserved in their own juice as compared 
to those preserved in sugar.359 Subsequently, in September 1904, the Board of 
United States General Appraisers laid down a series of rules for the classification 
of canned pineapples from Singapore and the corresponding duties.360 American 
demand for canned pineapples continued to grow and the value of Singapore 
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canned pineapples imported by the United States rose from $280,410 in 1904 to 
$374,543 in 1906.361 
 
 In the early 1900s, the growth of US-Singapore commerce encouraged the 
establishment of more American trade and banking institutions in Singapore to 
provide services that catered to American merchants. In 1902, the International 
Banking Corporation, an American bank, set up a Singapore branch to serve the 
growing US-Singapore trade.362 As the second branch after Shanghai to be 
opened in Asia, Singapore was evidently significant to US business interests in 
the region.363 Moreover, the opening of an American bank in Singapore would 
further facilitate US-Singapore trade by providing loans and advances to 
American merchants to fund their business ventures in Singapore.364 Soon after, 
Singer Sewing Machine Company, the world’s largest manufacturer of sewing 
machines, established a branch in Singapore in 1903.365 More importantly, by 
1904, there was an American trading house in Singapore, H.J.M. Ellis & Co., that 
handled the sale of American goods.366 This was a major change from how 
economic transactions between Singapore and the United States used to be 
mainly conducted through European trading houses.367 Thus during 1901-1904, 
the nature of US-Singapore trade began to evolve as American merchants started 
to break away from their reliance on European agencies and institutions. 
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Williams and the Singapore Consulate-general 
 The complex process of change that US-Singapore interactions were 
undergoing during 1901-1904 was reflected in the correspondence between 
Williams and the US State Department. The conflicting views between Williams 
and the State Department in relation to Singapore’s importance to the United 
States points towards a transitional phase in US-Singapore interactions. During 
his term of office, consul-general Williams was cognizant of Singapore’s rising 
importance to the United States as shown by his despatches. When Williams first 
took charge of the Singapore consulate, he found his salary to be grossly 
inadequate and complained to the State Department.368 He even collected 
information on other consulates to make comparisons in order to substantiate 
his case, though it is not known how he managed to obtain the figures. In his 
despatch to the State Department dated 25 June 1901, Williams stated: 
For five Consular stations in this part of the world – Chefoo, Tientsin, 
Hong Kong, Nagasaki, and Melbourne. The average salary paid at these 
stations [was] … greater than mine while my business with U.S.A. 
amounts to almost four times as much as that of the five named 
stations combined.369 
 
In addition, he adds that there “is not a day when we have not from fifty to a 
hundred steamers in port to say nothing of sailing ships, schooners, and other 
craft[s].”370 This is indicative of the contemporaneous problems faced by the US 
consular service as the classification of consulates was outdated and consular 
salaries remained tied to this system of arranging the consular posts into 
                                                        





different grades of importance.371 By such standards, Singapore was obviously an 
unimportant outpost, though Williams tried to argue otherwise. 
 
 Williams’ expectation of a higher salary was influenced by the changing 
responsibilities of a consul. Whereas in 1897, the most important duty of the 
consul was the examination and authentication of invoices of merchandise,372 by 
the early years of the twentieth century, providing accurate commercial 
information and promoting US export trade both became important duties of a 
consul.373 Hence Williams felt that he was entitled to a higher salary that 
corresponded to his unceasing consular responsibilities and the commercial 
importance of his post. There were many instances of previous consul-generals 
at Singapore asking for a raise, but they generally justified it by complaining that 
their salary was insufficient for their expenses.374 However, Williams’ request 
was different, as he sought a salary increase by repeatedly using the economic 
significance of Singapore to the United States to reason with the State 
Department. Still, reforming the consular service to match new consular 
responsibilities and criteria took time and Williams had no choice but to work 
within the old consular system amidst the changing developments of the period. 
 
 In its response, the State Department disagreed with Williams on his 
“estimate of the relative importance of the office at Singapore” and even claimed 
that Williams’ statement regarding Straits Settlements’ trade with the United 
                                                        
371 Werking, The Master Architects, pp.6-7. 
372 Ibid. 
373 Sidney Ratner, James H. Soltow and Richard Sylla (eds.), The Evolution of the American 
Economy: Growth, Welfare, and Decision Making (New York: Macmillan Pub. Co, 1993), p.394. 
374 Sodhy, “United States Consuls in Singapore 1859-1880”, pp.29-30. 
84 
 
States as being four times that of Hong Kong was “a false assumption” on his 
part.375 But Williams countered: 
Permit me in this to refer you to U.S. Government Returns wherein 
you will observe that the Exports from this district to U.S.A. during the 
calendar year 1899 amounted to $13,849,500, while the same from 
the Hong Kong district for the same year amounted to only 
$2,399,943. Showing exports from my district to U.S.A. for year 1899 
to have been almost six times the value of exports to U.S.A. from Hong 
Kong district same year.376  
 
Moreover, during the last half of 1900, exports from the Straits Settlements were 
“more than four and one-third times the amount from Hong Kong”.377 It should 
be noted that Williams’ assessment was based on only the Straits Settlements’ 
exports to the United States and he justified it by asserting that “exports is all the 
trade with which Consuls officially deal”.378 Again, Williams’ argument echoed 
the voices of reform in the consular service, where consuls were gradually 
expected to “foster and extend [American] trade”.379 Unfortunately, until the 
consular service was reformed in 1906, the State Department would not take 
these new duties and standards into account.  
 
 Williams’ post was revoked by President Theodore Roosevelt on 22 
January 1905 due to an unfavourable report made by the Third Assistant 
Secretary of State, Herbert H.D. Peirce.380 Apparently, Williams was found to 
have “attempted to exert pressure upon the Sultan [of Lingga and Rhio] in his 
official capacity to oblige the Sultan to pay an alleged debt owed to a 
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Chinaman”.381 Williams was found to have overstepped the limits of his authority 
since relations with the Sultan were out of the sphere of Williams’ official 
consular functions as neither the debtor nor creditor were American citizens.382 
Williams only defence was to plead ignorance as he asserted that “he was 
unaware that the realm of the Sultan was outside his jurisdiction”.383 
Unfortunately, the Department was not satisfied with his explanation and he was 
removed from his post. The dismissal of Williams echoed that of Pratt’s as both 
had made the same mistake of exceeding their authority. Nonetheless, among the 
US consul-generals who took charge after the Spanish-American War, Williams 
served the longest and provided some measure of stability to US-Singapore 
interactions during this period. 
 
Conclusion 
 From 1901-1904, the relationship between the United States and 
Singapore gradually expanded as new connections were forged between the two 
through the Philippines. As Washington grappled with the growing connections 
between the United States and Singapore, friction between Williams and the 
State Department increased since they had different views on Singapore’s 
importance to the United States. While American rule in the Philippines 
gradually stabilised, the United States faced another problem in the Asia-Pacific. 
In 1902, the United States extended its Chinese exclusion policy to the 
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Philippines, barring Chinese labourers from entering the islands.384 The Chinese 
exclusion policy had been in effect since 1882 when the US government passed 
the legislation that prohibited the immigration of Chinese labourers.385 
Consequently, China’s discontent over the Chinese exclusion policy grew and in 
1905, the Chinese merchant community initiated a boycott of American goods. 
This anti-American campaign came to exert a dominant influence on US-
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Chapter Four: The Chinese Boycott 
 
 From 1905 to 1906, the relationship between the United States and 
Singapore underwent further changes due to international developments. In May 
1905, the Shanghai Chamber of Commerce organised a boycott against American 
goods in an attempt to pressure the US government to modify the Chinese 
exclusion policy.386 At that time, the Chinese exclusion policy was embodied by 
the Gresham-Yang Treaty of 1894, which had expired in December 1904.387 
Amidst negotiations for a new immigration treaty between the United States and 
China, the boycott movement was launched. The movement grew rapidly within 
China and soon spread among the overseas Chinese communities in the 
Philippines, Japan, Bangkok, Malaya and Singapore.388 In Singapore, the boycott 
of American goods started in June 1905 and lasted a year. This chapter will 
discuss how the Chinese boycott affected US interactions with Singapore, 
especially in terms of its consequences on US-Singapore trade. The boycott also 
marked a shift in US-Singapore ties as the event led Washington officials to 
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Economic Impact of the Boycott 
 During the initial stages of the Chinese boycott, the attention of US 
officials was drawn to the potential danger of the boycott on American trade in 
Singapore. On 20 June 1905, a meeting was held at Tongji (Thong Chai) Hospital 
where a resolution that Chinese traders in Singapore would stop all trading in 
American goods was passed unanimously.389 Following that on 22 June 1905, 
David Wilber (Williams’ replacement as US consul-general at Singapore) cabled 
the State Department to notify them of this development. Wilber further 
elaborated in his 23 June report: 
This meeting was held on Tuesday the twentieth in the Chinese 
Hospital, [with] over two hundred representative Chinese merchants 
being in attendance….As the Chinese predominate to such an extent 
[comprising] seventy five percent of the total population I deemed 
this step important enough to cable.390 
 
Wilber recognised the ramifications of this resolution and was worried that it 
could adversely affect commercial ties between the United States and Singapore. 
Sharing similar concerns, Washington instructed Wilber in August 1905 to 
“watch and report any developments in the situation”.391 Since all previous 
contracts between Chinese and American merchants would be carried out until 
they expired, the full impact of the boycott would not be felt until the end of 
1905.392 
 
                                                        
389 Lat Pau, 21 June 1905; The Straits Times, 22 June 1905; See Michael R. Godley, The Mandarin 
Capitalists from Nanyang: Overseas Chinese Enterprise in the Modernisation of China, 1893-1911 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.123; See also Yen Ching Hwang, The Overseas 
Chinese and the 1911 Revolution: With Special Reference to Singapore and Malaya (Kuala Lumpur: 
Oxford University Press, 1976), p.64; but the venue was stated as Tan Tock Seng Hospital in the 
Singapore Free Press, 21 June 1905. 
390 Despatches, 23 June 1905. 
391 Alvey Adee, Acting Secretary of State, to David Wilber, American Consul General at Singapore, 
7 August 1905; Despatches from Department of State, Vol V; Consular Posts, Singapore, Straits 
Settlements; Records of Foreign Service Posts, RG 84; NACP. 
392 Singapore Free Press, 21 June 1905; Despatches, 21 December 1905. 
89 
 
 The Chinese boycott became the first instance where American business 
interests were threatened by the actions of merchants in Singapore. As a result of 
the campaign against American goods, the total value of US imports into 
Singapore plunged by about 15% from $2,587,955 in 1905 to $2,189,829 in 
1906.393 Similarly, there was a considerable drop of about 5% in the total value 
of exports from Singapore to the United States from $20,285,943 in 1905 to 
$19,266.515 in 1906.394 Considering that the boycott ended by June 1906, the 
movement was relatively successful in curtailing US-Singapore trade. Wilber’s 
despatch on 13 November 1905 substantiates the boycott’s success as he stated: 
I have the honor to report in regard to the Boycott condition, that 
there has been a decided serious turn of affairs in Singapore….All 
handlers of American goods claim that business is practically at a 
standstill so far as sales to Chinese are concerned, and that is the 
largest part of the trade here.395 
 
His account illustrated the extent of economic influence wielded by Chinese 
business community in Singapore. By December 1905, the list of boycotted 
American merchandise spanned four pages and included consumer goods such 
as perfumes, watches, lamps, soap, textiles, cigars, kerosene oil, flour and other 
food items.396 British reports also commented that the “Chinese boycott of 
American goods was mostly observable in such articles as Wheat Flour, Imitation 
Lard, Tobacco, and Wire nails”.397 
 
 The agency of the Chinese community in US-Singapore economic 
interactions was also brought to the fore by the anti-American boycott. 
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Historians, such as Pamela Sodhy, have claimed that in the early 1900s, the 
relationship between the United States and Singapore was dominated by 
American officials and merchants as well as British colonial authorities, and the 
populace in Singapore generally played a passive role.398 However, the 
communities residing in Singapore were not always passive, as shown by how 
the Chinese merchants actively boycotted American goods in an attempt to 
pressure Washington to amend their Chinese exclusion policy. Fearful of the 
implications the Chinese exclusion policy may have for the immigration 
restrictions on the movement of Chinese in British Malaya, the Chinese 
community stirred into action.399 Posters and circulars were prominently pasted 
in all Chinese shops and anonymous warning letters were sent to merchants 
handling American products.400 On 3 December 1905 a memorial service was 
held for boycott martyr Feng Xia Wei,401 who committed suicide in front of the 
American consulate in Shanghai on 27 July 1905.402 At the service, “over a 
thousand Chinese gathered”, to “express their determination to persevere in the 
boycott of American goods”.403 In addition, on 13 December 1905 when an 
American ship, the Acme, docked in Singapore for repair work, the Chinese 
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coolies went on strike.404 Since the strike directly affected social order, British 
colonial authorities stepped in and threatened the Chinese workers with 
deportation to get them to resume work.405 Evidently, the strength of the boycott 
movement lay in the widespread support drawn from the diverse segments of 
Chinese society, ranging from the professionals and businessmen to the working 
class.406 
 
 Furthermore, the repercussions of the anti-American campaign stretched 
beyond 1906. At the height of the boycott in January 1906, Wilber already 
foresaw that “it will take many years to remove the ill effect resulting from the 
injury already done.”407 This observation proved true especially in the case of 
American flour where the Chinese boycott had a lasting impact as it paved the 
way for Australian flour to enter the Singapore and Malayan markets.408 A report 
in the Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Countries During the 
Year 1906 corroborates this: 
The flour market [in Singapore and Malaya] has been captured by 
Australia, the transfer of the greater portion of the trade from the 
Pacific coast having originated with the Chinese boycott of American 
goods.409 
 
Consequently, after 1906, American flour had to contend with Australian flour 
for a share of the Singapore market. Another American enterprise affected by the 
boycott was the Standard Oil Company. During this period, Standard Oil was 
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trying to increase the sale of its products but the boycott provided the 
opportunity for its British and Dutch competitors to further encroach upon 
Standard Oil’s share in the Singapore market.410 Although the anti-American 
movement only lasted a year, fierce competition exacerbated its effects and 
American merchants had to work hard to regain their lost market share after 
1906. 
 
 Ironically, the anti-American boycott raised awareness of the potential of 
American commerce in Singapore among the US officials and businessmen. The 
interest of American department officials and merchants can be observed from 
the Commercial Relations of the United States with Foreign Countries During the 
Year 1906, which is a yearly official publication that is “designed to supply 
accurate information for the benefit of the producers, manufacturers and 
shippers of the United States in the general expansion of [American] 
commerce”.411 The 1906 issue was especially significant as it was the first time 
that an official American publication compared Singapore with the China market. 
The report asserted: 
The local market is very similar to that of southern China, … The 
consumption of cotton goods in the Straits Settlements alone is not 
great, as will be seen from the imports and exports given, and is 
accounted for by the fact that there is only 650,000 population in the 
colony, but adjacent territory and islands are responsible for the large 
imports and exports. The bulk of the exports go to Siam, the 
Federated Malay States, British North Borneo, Dutch Borneo, Java, 
Sumatra, Celebes, and to the southern Philippine Islands.412 
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From this, it can be seen that the American officials were becoming increasingly 
interested in the potential of US-Singapore trade and this change was probably a 
result of the Chinese boycott in Singapore. The similarity between the Straits 
Settlements and China was likely to be drawn because of the Chinese boycott, 
especially since it highlighted the ties between the Chinese community in the 
Straits Settlements and Southern China. By the early 1900s, the Chinese 
community in Singapore had comprised China-born immigrants, and the Straits 
Chinese, whose ancestors came from South China.413  
 
 The end of the excerpt, which draws the connections between Singapore 
and its neighbouring territories, also stresses the importance of Singapore as an 
entrepot for Southeast Asia. US officials were becoming increasingly aware that 
Singapore’s economic importance lay with its central role in a regional network 
of trade. Singapore was a transhipment centre and its economic viability hinged 
on its position as a key node in the trading networks.414 These networks were 
based on an extended sea-linked foreland that spanned across much of the 
Indian Ocean and the South China seas.415 But the report above only described 
Singapore’s entrepot trade with the Malay archipelago and Southeast Asia. The 
US administration had yet to grasp the extent of Singapore’s maritime networks 
that stretched across China, India, and the Arabian peninsula.416 Still, the 
dawning realisation of the implications this would have for American trade made 
the US administration pay more attention to Singapore. 
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Methodist Schools and the Chinese Boycott 
 Despite the boycott’s negative impact on official trade relations between 
Singapore and the United States, the anti-American movement did not appear to 
affect the unofficial interactions between the American Methodist missionaries 
and the Chinese community in Singapore. The involvement of the Straits Chinese 
community in the boycott points to an interesting situation for the Straits 
Chinese students studying in American mission schools in Singapore. Although 
the loyalty of the Straits Chinese generally lay with the British Empire instead of 
China,417 the Chinese boycott enjoyed a measure of support from the Straits 
Chinese community.418 In fact, Dr Lim Boon Keng, a prominent Straits Chinese, 
was elected the chairman of the boycott committee.419 The participation of the 
Straits Chinese community in the anti-American campaign was probably because 
the Chinese exclusion legislation applied to the Straits Chinese as well, even 
though they were considered subjects under the British Empire.420 By 1905, 
many Straits Chinese students were enrolled in the few English-medium schools 
established by American Methodist missionaries.421 These schools included the 
Anglo-Chinese School and the Telok Ayer Girls’ School (Fairfield Methodist Girls’ 
School).422 
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 Yet although there was a call to extend the boycott movement to 
American teachers on 20 June 1905, it appears that little or no action was taken 
as there was no record of students missing school in large numbers.423 On the 
contrary, the Methodists had documented that the Anglo-Chinese School’s 
“enrolment [had] steadily increased” for the year of 1905.424 By 1906, the school 
“passed the high-water mark, [with] the enrolment now being about 1040” 
students.425 An article published on 21 June 1905 in the Singapore Free Press 
provided a clue to understanding the situation: 
It seems hardly likely however that such an extreme measure [of 
including American teachers in the boycott] will be adopted. The 
Chinese possess…enough common sense to know that the Americans 
are doing a vast educational work in China and elsewhere, and they 
are not likely to cut off their noses to spite their faces…426 
 
By boycotting the American Methodist schools, the Straits Chinese students 
would be the ones to suffer since their education would be affected. Additionally, 
should the students be expelled, they would find it difficult to enrol in another 
English-medium school as demand for English education far outstripped supply. 
 
 The apparent lack of student involvement in the Chinese boycott in 
Singapore contrasted sharply with the students’ significant role in the boycott 
movement in China.427 In Canton, societies of students banded together and 
swore an oath not to purchase any American products.428 Meanwhile, in Hong 
Kong, Chinese students at Queen College tore up dictionaries donated by an 
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American company to protest against the Chinese Exclusion Act.429 However, 
there is no mention of student activity pertaining to the boycott in Singapore, 
suggesting that the students did not play a substantial role in the campaign. The 
glaring absence of such accounts in primary and secondary documents is in 
contrast to a smaller incident, the Isaiah affair of 1896. On 27 July 1896, the 
Singapore Free Press published a letter by “Isaiah”, accusing Methodist 
missionaries of compelling their students to become Christians.430 Several 
students withdrew from the Anglo-Chinese School as a result and the incident 
took time to blow over.431 Since this involved the conversion of one’s faith and 
religion, this issue was very sensitive and there was greater coverage in the print 
media in comparison. 
 
 In spite of the media attention received by the boycott, much of the 
reports focused on the political and economic aspects. Little was mentioned in 
the press about student involvement in the boycott. Though the anti-American 
movement was widespread, it did not result in the boycott of mission schools. 
The boycott’s lack of student participation was likely because few Chinese 
students in Singapore would further their studies in the US. Most Straits Chinese 
students would opt to study in Britain, especially since they were British 
subjects. The students might not want to risk their prestigious English education 
for protesting against the Chinese Exclusion Act, which would be unlikely to 
affect them. 
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 Moreover, interactions between American missionaries and the Chinese 
community in Singapore were not only limited to the religious sphere, but also 
extended to the political aspects of the boycott. At Singapore’s first boycott 
meeting on 20 June 1905, You Lie, a native of the Guangdong province in China, 
called on American missionaries to return to their home countries and proposed 
that Chinese Christians turn to “English pastors, or elect their own Chinese 
pastors to continue the work of the Church”.432 However, Methodist records do 
not indicate that the anti-American movement had an effect on missionary 
efforts in Singapore. The Minutes of the Malaysia Conference in 1906 stated: 
The Foochow Chinese Church has done well, although the statistics 
show a decrease from last year. They have had 16 baptisms and have 
received a number of probationers, and yet there is a decrease owing 
solely to the large number of [repatriations] to China.433 
 
Attributing the problems of the mission to the migratory cycle of the Chinese 
population, the Methodists made no reference to the 1905 boycott in these 
accounts. On the other hand, in the September 1905 issue of The Malaysia 
Message, a Methodist magazine, an article questioned: 
… why is there discrimination against the Chinese? The Chinaman is a 
sober, hardworking man. He attends to his own business. He is as 
easily educated as the European….It is to be hoped that there will be 
no long interval before this question of the proper treatment of 
Chinese who arrive at American ports will be settled to the mutual 
satisfaction of the parties concerned.434 
 
Although this author did not necessarily represent the feelings of all the 
American Methodists, it did show that some Methodists took an interest in the 
anti-American movement and expressed sympathy for the boycotters and their 
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cause. Perhaps these publicised sentiments of the Methodists were another 
reason why the mission schools were unaffected by the boycott. 
 
The Boycott and US-Singapore Political Ties 
 Though the boycott had little impact on the missionary efforts of 
American Methodists, official trade and diplomatic interactions between 
Singapore and the United States were adversely affected. The anti-American 
campaign was sufficiently significant to Washington such that it warranted direct 
communication between the US Secretary of State and the British Foreign Office. 
Problems concerning Singapore were usually settled between the US consul-
general and the British Colonial Office, but the boycott came to involve direct 
attention from London and Washington. On 14 November 1905, Wilber cabled 
the US Secretary of State, Elihu Root, reporting that the boycott had “taken [a] 
decidedly serious turn” and that American trade with the Chinese in Singapore 
was at a “standstill”.435 Upon receiving Wilber’s telegram, Root directed 
Whitelaw Reid, US Ambassador in London, “to request that the British 
Government take the gravity of the situation into consideration and adopt such 
protective and repressive measures as may be practicable”.436 On 8 December 
1905, the British Foreign Office responded: 
Mr. [Colonial] Secretary Lyttleton will forward a copy of the 
correspondence on the subject to Sir J. Anderson, the governor of the 
Straits Settlements, who will doubtless take such measures as may be 
practicable to deal with any unlawful acts… Mr Lyttleton, however, 
points out that unless actual offenses against the colonial laws have 
been or being committed it may be difficult for the colonial 
authorities to take any effective action in this matter.437 
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 Following that, on 15 December 1905, Root requested a “copy of a note 
from the foreign office stating that the matter will be brought to the attention of 
the governor of the Straits Settlements”.438 The Foreign Office replied on 6 
February 1906: 
… a dispatch has been received from the governor of the Straits 
Settlements in regard to that question. Sir John Anderson reports 
that…the leaders have been reminded of the risk of such a movement 
leading to violence and intimidation if it should spread to the cooly 
class, and have been warned that they will be held responsible should 
this be the case.…The police and the protectorate have been 
instructed to exercise the greatest vigilance in the matter...439 
 
These exchanges reflected the urgency that Washington felt in dealing with the 
Chinese boycott. Even though the State Department had instructed Wilber to 
inform the Governor of the Straits Settlements of the matter, Washington 
apparently felt that the dire situation necessitated the additional step of directly 
requesting the British government to take action against the boycotters in 
Singapore.440  
 
 The economic ramifications of the boycott also translated into political 
tensions between American officials and British colonial authorities in Singapore 
during 1905-1906. US-Singapore interactions were usually harmonious, but the 
Chinese boycott created conflict between American and British officials as they 
disagreed on how to deal with the boycotters. On 14 November, Wilber 
described the extent of the boycott in his despatch: 
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The Chinese Chamber of Commerce, I am told, by both the Standard 
Oil and British American Tobacco people, have notified many of the 
people handling products of these two Companies, that they must 
discontinue to do so….Several handlers of Standard Oil and British 
American Tobacco Co’s products have received anonymous warning 
letters…441 
 
As instructed by the State Department, Wilber informed the Governor of the 
Straits Settlements, John Anderson, of the situation.442 Though Anderson 
promised to “have the Police investigate the matter and ascertain if any violation 
of the laws had been committed”, the boycott showed no signs of abating and 
American trade in Singapore suffered.443 Hence on 4 December 1905, Wilber 
expressed his displeasure towards British officials: 
I am not at all satisfied with the position which the Government 
officials are taking in this matter. They are too passive and show a 
lack of sincerity…444 
 
Still, the British authorities maintained that they would not interfere in the 
boycott “unless there [was] open intimidation of a violent character”.445  
 
 Wilber handled the boycott situation as best as he could, especially since 
that he had little experience in the consular service. Prior to his appointment as 
US consul-general at Singapore, Wilber only served as US consul to Barbados 
from 1903 to 1905.446 He was formerly a Member of Congress from New York 
State and had many powerful political connections, including two New York 
politicians: Thomas C. Platt, US Senator and Walter L. Brown, New York State 
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Senator.447 However, Wilber’s consular post was not simply acquired through the 
political patronage system as most consuls during this period were. Under 
Executive Order 81, Wilber had to sit for an examination in order to secure a 
consular post and he passed with a score of 8.5 on a scale of 10.448 Executive 
Order 81 was promulgated by Grover Cleveland on 20 September 1895 and it 
instituted an examination system for the appointment of consuls.449 Wilber’s 
appointment was an indication that the US consular service was slowly moving 
towards reform.450 He represented the beginning of the professionalisation of 
the consular service and his management of the boycott situation was an 
indication of what a trained and efficient consular service can accomplish. After 
1906, all consuls had to undergo examinations like Wilber to ensure that they 
possessed the capabilities and expertise to handle the job. 
 
Conclusion 
 By June 1906, the Chinese boycott had faded away due to a lack of 
coordination among the boycott leaders451 and US-Singapore trade resumed 
normally after a year of turmoil.452 Even though the movement proved 
significant in disrupting American trade with Singapore, it failed to achieve its 
larger aim of compelling the United States to change the Chinese exclusion 
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policy. During 1905-1906, the anti-American campaign had significant political 
and economic ramifications that affected the dynamics of the US-Singapore 
relationship. Through the boycott, the Chinese community in Singapore 
demonstrated their agency and extent of their influence on Singapore’s official 
interactions with the United States. The boycott also marked another transitional 
phase in US-Singapore ties as it made Washington more aware of Singapore’s 
rising importance to the United States, especially in terms of trade. By June 1906, 
closer ties were fostered between the United States and Singapore as 
interactions between the two had expanded, evolved and developed into a 




























 My thesis has delved into the multitude of changes that US-Singapore 
interactions underwent during the years 1898-1906. During this period, various 
international events came to exert a dominant influence on US-Singapore 
interactions at different points in time. By studying both official and unofficial 
interactions, I have demonstrated how events in the Philippines and China have 
brought about changes in the nature of Singapore’s relationship with the United 
States and illustrated the extent of these changes. In 1898, the Spanish-American 
War marked the United States’ entry into the Pacific and heightened American 
political, economic and missionary interests in the Asia-Pacific. Since Singapore 
was a key port in the region, many of these developing American interests were 
reflected in the changing dynamics of US-Singapore interactions. Singapore 
became embroiled in the Spanish-American War because its strategic location in 
the Pacific region gave it a short-term military significance. Furthermore, the 
actions of US consul-general Pratt in gaining Aguinaldo’s cooperation 
inadvertently affected the course of the war. On 10 December 1898, Spain signed 
the Treaty of Paris and ceded the Philippines to the United States. 
 
 The acquisition of the islands transformed US role in the Pacific from that 
of an observer to an active player. When the United States became a colonial 
power, the triangular relationship between the United States, Singapore and 
Britain expanded to encompass the Philippines. The Philippine-American War in 
1899 crystallised the links between the United States, Singapore and the 
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Philippines, and added complexity and depth to US-Singapore interactions. The 
establishment of American authority in the Philippines led to the unprecedented 
expansion of US presence in the Pacific and in mid-1900, the US army in the 
Philippines reached its peak strength of 72,000 troops.453 With the pacification of 
the Philippine Islands, the number of American merchants and missionaries 
increased rapidly as well. As American involvement in the Asia-Pacific deepened, 
US relations with China came to be entwined in an intricate network of regional 
connections that included the Philippines and Singapore. Consequently, the 
relationship between the United States and Singapore was not only entangled 
with the events in the Philippines, but was also inextricably linked with 
developments in China. The anti-American boycott which originated from China 
rapidly spread to the overseas Chinese communities in the Pacific, including 
Singapore. As a result, US-Singapore ties were affected and their relationship 
underwent further changes as American officials and merchants became 
increasingly aware of Singapore’s importance to US interests in the region. 
 
 Singapore’s economic prosperity in the region was widely recognised and 
over the years, many ports sought to replicate its commercial success.454 The 
Dutch attempted to establish free ports in the Netherlands East Indies, such as 
Macassa, Menado and Kema.455 But Singapore’s formula for success was not 
simply based on its free-port status and despite the increasing number of rival 
ports in the region, Singapore continued to be the centre of trade and shipping in 
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Southeast Asia.456 Thus when the United States came into possession of the 
Philippine Islands, US officials grew interested in learning more about the British 
colony of Singapore. The American administration was unprepared and ill-
equipped in handling colonies because there were no precedents that they could 
rely on.457 Hence, US administrators started studying other colonies in the region 
to learn about the finer details of colonial governance. Singapore’s economic 
success and political stability was particularly appealing to US officials and they 
sought to gather more information and data pertaining to the colonial 
administration in Singapore.  
 
 The types of questions asked by American officials indicate their lack of 
knowledge about colonial matters. The wide range of information requested 
included issues such as custom duties, opium policy, civil service and developing 
rubber industries. This also reveals how thorough the American administration’s 
collection of data about Singapore was. Moreover, it also demonstrates that the 
US policymakers were serious in their efforts to set up proper colonial structures 
in the Philippines that would be effective in administering the islands. However, 
the extent to which American officials had applied British experiences in 
Singapore to their colonisation of the Philippines remains unclear. As historian 
Julian Go noted, “[it] is not that U.S. agents copied the policies of other imperial 
powers wholesale… at the very least, the global-imperial field was something 
that they could not ignore as they formulated, fashioned, and carried out their 
colonial effort in the Philippines.”458 Although American experiences in the 
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Philippines appear to differ from that of British Malaya, there were also 
similarities between the two colonial systems such as the racial undertones of 
the policies and their paternalistic sentiments towards their colonies. Hence, an 
aspect that merits further research is the colonial philosophy and structures that 
shaped US administration in the Philippines as it may shed more light on the 
Philippines and its links with British Malaya or other colonies. While American 
officials did refer to and study British experiences in Singapore, this was not 
always to the benefit of the American colonial administration as evinced by the 
failure of Philippine rubber plantations, which were modelled after Singapore’s 
success in rubber planting. Nonetheless, the colonisation of the Philippines made 
a difference to US-Singapore interactions as it forged new connections between 
the two. 
 
 The role of US consul-general at Singapore in facilitating the interactions 
between the United States and Singapore is an underlying theme of this thesis. 
The quality of US consular representation in Singapore depended on the consul-
general as he had the power to influence US foreign policy in the region. Pratt’s 
actions in securing the cooperation of Aguinaldo, which resulted in a change in 
the course of the Spanish-American War is one such example. Yet despite the 
important role of the consular service in US policy, many of the consuls were ill-
trained and ill-qualified.459 Prior to 1906, US consuls were often appointed based 
on their personal connections with key political figures instead of their ability 
and competence, and this resulted in general consular inefficiency as many of 
these consuls were not equipped with the necessary skills to carry out their 
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jobs.460 But as American merchants and government officials showed greater 
interest in foreign markets in the 1890s, there was an increasing need for an 
improved consular service that could help extend American trade overseas.461 
Consequently, US businessmen pushed for the professionalisation of the consular 
service though reform was slow.462 This move towards reorganising the consular 
system formed the backdrop to the changes in US-Singapore interactions from 
1898-1906. 
 
 The various US consul-generals who were posted to Singapore reflected 
the gradual move towards consular reform. Pratt, Moseley and Williams 
obtained their posts through political patronage and their lack of 
professionalism was reflected by their actions. Pratt overstepped his boundaries 
by approaching Aguinaldo for an alliance and the controversy that ensued over 
their secret meeting resulted in his dismissal. His successor, Moseley, was clearly 
inexperienced in consular work and constantly consulted the State Department 
on many issues. Williams, who took over from Moseley, exceeded his authority 
by interfering in an issue that was outside his jurisdiction. The dismissal of Pratt 
and Williams was revealing of the trend of inept or corrupt consular officers in 
China and the Asia-Pacific.463 However, Wilber’s appointment in 1905 was an 
indication that the US consular service was moving towards reform. He was one 
of the few consuls who sat for an examination under Executive Order 81 to 
secure his consular post. A year later, President Theodore Roosevelt’s order on 
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27 June 1906 stated that those appointed to the US consular service had to 
undergo examinations to determine if they are qualified.464 Thus 1906 marked 
the transformation of the consular system from an ad-hoc makeshift 
representation to a professional consular service.  
 
 1906 is the endpoint of my research on the changes in US-Singapore 
interactions because the impact of the professionalisation of the consular service 
on US-Singapore interactions deserves further study. Roosevelt’s order was 
different from previous reforms as it explicitly disavowed political 
considerations in the selection process and highlighted demonstrated efficiency 
as the basis of promotion.465 In 1906, the consular reorganisation bill 
establishing a consular inspection corps was also passed and this inspection 
procedure made possible a reformation of the service as incompetent officers 
retired and were replaced by more competent men.466 The reform of the 
consular service was a gradual process as attempts to reorganise the service 
stretched till 1915.467 There is room for further research on US-Singapore 
interactions during the years 1906-1914 as Singapore’s consular relations with 
the United States before World War I remains understudied. As part of the 
professionalisation of the US consular service, an informal Far Eastern bureau 
was created in 1907 to give specialised attention to events within the 
geographical area of the Far East.468 In 1908, the Division of Far Eastern Affairs 
was formally established and was in charge of diplomatic and consular 
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correspondence “on matters other than those of an administrative character, in 
relation to China, Japan, Korea, Siam, Straits Settlements, Borneo, East Indies, 
India and in general the Far East”.469 Further research should be conducted to 
examine the impact of this development on US-Singapore consular relations after 
1906. 
 
 This thesis positions the relationship between the United States and 
Singapore from 1898-1906 within the larger contextual framework of 
international and regional affairs, which scholars have generally overlooked. 
This approach sheds more light on the changing dynamics of their interactions 
during this period. As mentioned in the introduction, existing studies on 
Singapore’s relationship with the United States in the pre-1945 period tend to 
neglect these wider international contexts. Yet contexts are of critical importance 
to historical studies, and in the words of Singaporean historian Joey Long, 
“broader contexts can shed light on themes and subjects traditionally covered 
from a parochial national perspective”.470 Moreover, Singapore remains sensitive 
to external events even today and its history remains inextricably tied to 
regional and international events. These complexities should not be ignored in 
the study of US-Singapore interactions as they contribute to a fuller picture of 
Singapore’s relationship with the United States as well as with other countries.  
 
 This dissertation also opens up more space for the further exploration of 
British Malaya’s relationship with the United States in the pre-1945 period. 
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Future studies on US-Malaya interactions can adopt the same approach in 
positioning US-Malaya relations within the wider international frameworks. 
Despite the intertwining history of Singapore and Malaya, the trajectory of US-
Malaya relations may diverge from that of US-Singapore interactions as 
Singapore and Malaya were two distinct territories with different economies, 
governments and populations. The seat of British administrative power lay in 
Singapore, and much of the economic infrastructure and facilities were located in 
Singapore. The Methodists’ mission base was also situated in Singapore and not 
Malaya. Thus the works of Sodhy and Yacob, which incorporate US-Singapore 
interactions into their studies on US-Malaysia relations, may obscure rather than 
illuminate the diverse changes taking place in the different territories.471  
 
 Furthermore, in tracing US-Singapore’s ties during 1898-1906, it is clear 
that the focus on bilateral interactions between the two obfuscates significant 
changes in their relationship. US-Singapore studies need to be examined within 
the wider network of international relations, especially since US-Singapore 
interactions were often influenced by US relations with other countries, such as 
the Philippines and China. Singapore’s expanding commercial ties with the 
United States cannot be studied in isolation as well, especially since Singapore’s 
trade was susceptible to external influences as a result of its free port status and 
open economy. In addition, American missionary efforts in Singapore was part of 
a wider Methodist movement in the region and by widening the context to 
include regional developments, a clearer picture of American missionary 
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involvement in Singapore emerges. Thus, more research on missionary efforts in 
the Pacific needs to be carried out especially for the period after 1906 to find out 
how the rapid growth of Methodism in the Philippines affected the missionaries’ 
base of operations in Singapore, or how the Methodists may have envisioned 
their mission differently after 1906. 
 
 The majority of existing studies on US-Singapore interactions in the pre-
1945 tend to focus on World War I and the interwar years. But this is a 
Eurocentric point of view as these studies concentrate on events that are deemed 
significant by the Europeans. Other regional events of importance in the Asia-
Pacific were neglected as a result. Thus this thesis adopts a relatively more 
Asian-centric approach where more emphasis is placed on the regional 
developments in the Pacific region, such as the colonisation of the Philippines 
and the Chinese boycott in 1905. My work teases out the political, economic and 
missionary interactions between the United States and Singapore. The role of the 
British is not so much highlighted here because its political control of Singapore 
did not always extend to American commercial and missionary ties with 
Singapore. This also allows a closer look at how American missionaries and 
traders interacted with the population in Singapore, particularly the Chinese 
community. 
 
 My research draws together the disparate groups of American officials, 
merchants and missionaries to explore a wide range of official and unofficial 
connections with Singapore. With the acquisition of the Philippines, US military 
presence in the Pacific burgeoned. Along with the expansion of official 
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interactions, American missionaries were ready to open a new mission field in 
Manila. Business opportunities also attracted American merchants to the Pacific 
region and accordingly, US trade with the Pacific region flourished and US-
Singapore commerce in particular grew rapidly. Over time, not just Washington 
but American businessmen and missionaries also had a stake in this part of the 
world and the opinions of the American merchants and religious groups started 
to matter. At times, conflicting views of Singapore’s significance to the United 
States resulted in tensions between these different groups. Despite their 
diverging motivations and objectives that drove their interactions with 
Singapore, American officials, businessmen and missionaries eventually came to 
the same realisation of Singapore’s increased importance to the United States. 
This convergence of opinions was a gradual process and the various groups of 
Americans grew more interested in Singapore at different points in time. These 
tensions characterised the transitional phase of US-Singapore interactions as 
American officials, merchants and missionaries grappled with the changes that 
unfolded during 1898-1906. 
 
 By showing that 1898-1906 was a period of change for US-Singapore 
interactions, this thesis poses more questions for the subsequent changes in 
their relationship in the inter-war years. Further studies can be conducted on 
whether the changes in Singapore’s relationship with the United States in 1898-
1906 laid the foundation for the transformation of US-Singapore ties in the 
interwar years. A closer look at US-Singapore interactions from 1906-1915 may 
provide some answers to these questions. Perhaps the trajectory of change was 
already set by 1906 and World War I simply accelerated the process. However, it 
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is also possible that there were two disparate periods of change in US-Singapore 
interactions in the pre-1945 period. These present further avenues for 
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